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THE  UNUSUAL  TURMOIL  in the U.S. economy during the 1970s has 
forced  a reexamination  of many  of its macroeconomic  characteristics.  In- 
flation  has been the most surprising  feature  of the period  and the investi- 
gation  of its causes  and  search  for cures  have  been  intense.  The worsening 
of the relation  between  inflation  and unemployment  has been a focus of 
that  investigation  and  has been  linked,  in part,  to the very  high  unemploy- 
ment  rates  experienced  by younger  members  of the work  force and  to the 
remarkable  rise  in participation  rates  of young  persons  and adult  women. 
These same developments  bear on the measurement  of potential gross 
national product, an important  underpinning  of both macroeconomic 
analysis  and  economic  policymaking. 
The 1974-75 recession  and its aftermath  have sparked  reestimates  of 
potential  GNP that are substantially  lower than  the previous  official  esti- 
mates and that anticipate  a slower growth  of potential  in coming  years 
than previous official  projections.  The Council of Economic Advisers 
lowered the former estimate of  1976 potential by $58 billion (1972 
prices), reducing the gap between potential and actual GNP to $99 
billion.'  One  element  in this  revision  is a change  in the unemployment  rate 
at which potential  is defined  from the traditional  4 percent  to a shifting 
rate  that  was 4.9 percent  in 1976. This adjustment  is related  to the higher 
unemployment  rates experienced  by younger  workers  and the declining 
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proportion  of adult males in the total work force. Another important 
element  in the CEA revisions  is the observed  weakness  in productivity 
since 1973. Output  per  hour  in the (nonresidential  nonfarm)  business  sec- 
tor  declined  by 31/2  percent  in 1974, the  first  decline  of any  size  in the  post- 
war years.  Despite  a sharp  increase  during  the 1976 economic  recovery, 
productivity  that  year  was still  only  21/4  percent  above  the 1973 level. The 
CEA analysis  associates  this weakness  with an inadequate  rate of capital 
accumulation  and  with  the sharp  rise in energy  prices  that coincided  with 
the recession.  These  factors  also lead them to project  a potential  growth 
rate  of only 31/2  percent  a year  through  1980.2  Data Resources,  Inc., has 
published  an analysis  that  lowers  the estimate  of the present  growth  rate 
of potential  even  further,  to 3.35 percent.3 
A different  challenge  to traditional  estimates  of potential output  has 
come  from  those  who question  the effect  of unemployment  on labor  force 
participation.  The sustained  growth  of the labor force right through  the 
1974-75 recession  years  surprised  many  observers.  If this recent  strength 
of participation  rates is viewed as evidence  of their insensitivity  to un- 
employment,  the traditional  markup  of the labor  force  of secondary  work- 
ers that is used in calculating  potential output is called into question. 
Without  a large induced rise in the work force between today's actual 
economy  and its potential,  the present  GNP gap would be substantially 
smaller  than calculations  such as Okun's  law imply. Theoretical  reasons 
for questioning  any direct  link between  unemployment  and  the size of the 
labor  force  have  been  provided  by economists  who  look, instead,  for a sub- 
stantial  response  of labor  force  palticipation  to wages  and  prices.  Michael 
Wachter  has raised  such doubts  about  the cyclical  behavior  of participa- 
tion  rates  in his own  empirical  estimates  of labor  force  behavior.4 
This paper  will reevaluate  the evidence  on the recent  and prospective 
behavior  of potential output. The issues just raised will be examined 
against  the background  of a previously  successful  approach  to estimating 
potential.5  The analysis  will start  with  the growth  in the labor  force,  which 
2. The analytic background  for the CEA revisions is available in Peter K. Clark, 
"A New Estimate of  Potential GNP" (Council of  Economic Advisers, 1977; pro- 
cessed). 
3. Roger Brinner, "Potential Growth to  1980," in  Otto Eckstein and others, 
Economic Issues and Parameters  of the Next 4 Years (Data Resources,  Inc., 1977). 
4.  Michael L. Wachter,  "A Labor Supply Model for Secondary  Workers,"  Review 
of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 54 (May 1972), pp. 141-51. 
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is an important  building  block in estimates  of potenitial  and is of con- 
siderable  interest  in itself. 
Labor  Force  Participation 
The substantial  differences  in the labor force behavior of different 
demographic  groups  make  it essential  to analyze  growth  in the labor  force 
on a disaggregated  basis. At a minimum,  data are available  by age-sex 
categories;  and with some sacrifice  in statistical  reliability  and historical 
continuity,  some  further  disaggregations  are  possible.  For a given  popula- 
tion cell, it is useful to decompose  labor force growth  into changes in 
the population  and changes  in participation  rates-the  proportion  of the 
population  in the work  force.  Analysis  of labor  force growth  then  focuses 
on participation  rates  of individual  population  groups. 
Rising  participation  by teenagers  and women  has been the outstanding 
and surprising  feature  behind  the rapid  growth  of the labor force in the 
past decade. Sociological  hypotheses  to explain this changing  behavior 
come  readily  to mind:  the greater  independence  of teenagers,  the changing 
values  and  attitudes  fostered  by the women's  movement,  the better  family 
planning  made  possible  by superior  contraceptives,  all must be involved. 
More narrowly  economic  hypotheses  can be offered  as well, built around 
the inflation  of the last decade and the change  in real living standards 
compared  with  expectations. 
To analyze  the present  level of potential  output  and  its past  growth,  one 
needs estimates  of the cyclical  response  of participation  rates  so that the 
labor  input  available  along  the potential  path  can  be measured.  I start  with 
some conventionally  estimated  equations  for participation  rates and then 
consider  whether alternative  hypotheses  about the observed growth  in 
participation  can  improve  these  calculations. 
CYCLICAL  VARIATIONS  IN  PARTICIPATION 
According  to the conventional  view,  participation  rates  for some demo- 
graphic  groups  vary  both cyclically,  with a larger  fraction  of the popula- 
tion in the labor force when unemployment  is low, and secularly,  for 
reasons  that  are  independent  of the  unemployment  rate.  Lacking  any  good 
way to identify  and quantify  the factors  behind  secular  changes,  past re- 
search  has generally  allowed  for them  by using  time-trend  variables.  After 14  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
some experimenting,  the following  form of estimating  equation  was used 
for each  of fourteen  demographic  groups  in the  present  analysis: 
(1)  log (LIP) = Ao  +  aju*  +  a2U*(-  1) +  a3T54  +  a4T67, 
where  L is the total  labor  force and  P is population;  u* and u  * (-1  ) are 
this  year's  and  last  year's  weighted  unemployment  rates,  respectively;  and 
T54 and T67 are time-trend  variables  starting  at 1 in 1954 and 1967, 
respectively,  and  rising  by 1 each  year.6  The concept  of a weighted  unem- 
ployment  rate  as a measure  of labor  market  tightness  is by now  familiar.7 
The form  of the dependent  variable  was chosen  after  some preliminary 
comparisons  between  it and log (1 -  L/P),  the "nonparticipation  rate," 
showed  no persistent  superiority  for either.  One worked  slightly  better  for 
some  groups  and  slightly  worse  for others.  Using  the nonparticipation  rate 
required  more abrupt  trend  changes (since it makes trends  in participa- 
tion rise more slowly  with time when, in fact, they speeded  up for some 
groups). And, while a constant  trend growth  rate in participation  rates 
such as equation  1 implies  cannot  go on forever,  that only warns  against 
extrapolating  it too far  into the  future. 
The choice of a second time trend starting  in 1967 was made after 
experimenting  with starting  points in 1964 and 1970. Once again,  some 
trends  fitted  better  for some population  groups  and  worse  for others.  The 
trend  starting  in 1964 sometimes  reduced  the estimated  cyclical  respon- 
siveness  of participation  rates, presumably  because more of the strong 
rise that occurred  as unemployment  fell between 1964 and 1966 was 
attributed  to trend.  These equations  generally  did not fit the data  quite  as 
well as the others.  And 1964 predated  the sociological  changes  that are 
hypothesized  to lie behind  the strongly  rising  participation  trends  of teen- 
agers  and  younger  women. 
There  was less difference  between  the estimates  using the time trends 
6. The data on the labor force, employment, and unemployment  used here and 
throughout the paper (except as noted) are official estimates and are adjusted for 
Census-year  changes and the changes in definition introduced in  1967. They are 
further  adjusted  to an employment basis (largely an establishment  basis) that corre- 
sponds to the output categories in the GNP accounts. The adjustments  are described 
in the appendix  to Perry, "Labor  Force Structure."  The necessary  data for the adjust- 
ment to an employment basis corresponding  to GNP were provided by Edward F. 
Denison from his worksheets  for a forthcoming  study. 
7. The version in this paper  uses the proportions  of different  demographic  groups 
in the labor force in 1966 together  with the relative-wage  and average-hour  factors of 
each group that were explained in George L. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets  and 
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starting  in 1967 and 1970, and also less a priori  basis for preferring  one 
to the other.  The appendix  summarizes  the cyclical  response,  time  trends, 
and goodness  of fit of equations  fitted  to each demographic  group  using 
these alternative  time trends  and some alternative  periods  of estimation. 
In general,  using  a time trend  starting  in 1970 resulted  in slightly  greater 
cyclical responsiveness.  So did ending the estimation  period in 1973, 
before the great recession.  Since all the estimates  show a very strong 
cyclical  responsiveness  in participation,  I chose  the most conservative,  the 
equations  using the trend starting  in 1967 and estimated  from 1954 to 
1976, which  includes  the period  of particular  interest  for estimating  poten- 
tial  in this  study.8 
Table 1 shows the estimated  equations  for the participation  rate for 
each  of the  demographic  groups.  Since  the several  equation  forms  shown  in 
the appendix  were compared  before the form of equations shown in 
table 1 was selected,  the basis for retaining  coefficients  relies on all the 
estimates  shown in the appendix.  All the unemployment  coefficients  in 
table 1 have a t  statistic of at least 1.6; the t  statistics were usually 
higher in equations  using a time trend starting  in  1970. Time-trend 
coefficients  were  kept if their  t statistics  were  greater  than 1.5; for all but 
the  over-65  age  group,  they  are  at  least  2.0 in the  table 1 estimates. 
For both sexes in the groups aged 16 to 24 and for women in the 
groups  aged 25 to 44, a statistically  significant  and quantitatively  impor- 
tant speedup  in the trend  of participation  rates is found using the 1967 
time  dummy.  For teenagers  and  women  aged  25 to 34, this acceleration  is 
a strikingly  large  3 to 4 percent  a year (on a base  of roughly  0.5 for partici- 
pation  rates  in these  groups).  Men 25 to 64 and  women  45 and over  show 
a statistically  significant  slowing  in participation  rates  using  the 1967 time 
dummy.  The net result  of the time trends  on participation  rates over the 
last ten years  is shown  in the last column  of table 1. Sharply  rising  trends 
are estimated  for women  of all age groups  between 16 and 44, with the 
average  annual  rate  of increase  ranging  between  about  2?/z  and  4 percent. 
Teenage  males  also show a pronounced  upward  trend,  while  men over 54 
and women over 64 have steep downward  trends.  The trends  for other 
demographic  groups  are  much  more  gradual. 
8. Using the same form of the trend, as well as the dependent  variable,  for all the 
demographic  groups was a way of minimizing the effects of the data mining that 
would have gone with selecting a "best-fitting"  equation for each group after experi- 
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Cyclical  Response. The cyclical  responsiveness  of participation  rates 
is summarized  in the next to last column of table 1, which shows the 
percentage  change  in participation  (or the labor  force) that  would  accom- 
pany  a sustained  increase  of 1 percentage  point  in the weighted  unemploy- 
ment rate. Although  these estimates  are the most conservative  of those 
available  from  the several  alternatives  shown  in appendix  table  A-1, they 
do predict  a stronger  cyclical  response,  particularly  for recent  years,  than 
many earlier  studies. According  to previous estimates summarized  by 
Okun, a one-point  decline in unemployment  added 0.6 percent to the 
labor  force."  For 1976, the present  estimates  indicate  that  an increment  in 
the labor  force  of about  0.9 percent  accompanies  each  point  of unemploy- 
ment.  However,  since the large  increments  to the work  force are concein- 
trated  among  young  workers  and  younger  adult  women-workers who, on 
the whole, receive  relatively  low productivity  weights  in the subsequent 
estimates  of potential  labor input  -the  potential  output  calculations  are 
not overly  influenced  by this difference  in estimates  of cyclical  participa- 
tion-rate  effects.  If the labor  force increments  were only three-fourths  as 
large,  thus bringing  them down to the average  cited by Okun, potential 
(weighted)  labor  input  in 1976 would  be only about  0.25 percent  below 
what  is estimated  using  the  table  1 equations. 
Part of the reason  for the large participation  effects estimated  in the 
table 1 equations  comes  from  effects  from  lagged  unemployment  that  turn 
up in the current  equations.  And part  results  from the increased  relative 
importance  of women and teenagers  in today's work force. The table 
below  analyzes  the changing  cyclical  responsiveness  of the aggregate  labor 
force (in terms  of percentage  change) that  results  from  this changing  mix. 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1976 
Change  per  point 
of weighted 
unemployment  0.82  0.82  0.87  0.95  1.02 
Change  per  point 
of conventional 
unemployment  0.82  0.82  0.85  0.87  0.88 
In terms of a point of weighted  unemployment,  the responsiveness  in- 
creased  by about  one-quarter  between  1960 and 1976. The change  is less 
marked  in terms  of conventional  unemployment  rates; the two changes 
are different  because the cyclical relation between conventional and 
9. Arthur M. Okun, "Upward Mobility in a High-Pressure  Economy," BPEA, 
1:1973, pp. 210-1 1. George L. Perry  19 
weighted  unemployment  has also shifted over this period. The relation 
between  the  conventionally  measured  unemployment  gap (u -  a) and  the 
weighted  unemployment  gap (u* - u)  is estimated  by the equation 
(2)  u - u-  =  0.996(u* - u7*)  +  0.0127[T(u* -  u*)], 
(65.7)  (6.7) 
Standard  error  0.00072;  Durbin-Watson = 1.9. 
where  T is a time-trend  variable  starting  in 1964 and  the  numbers  in paren- 
theses  are  I statistics  (as they  are  in the equations  throughout  this paper). 
The levels of unemployment  used to define  potential,  u* and ui,  are dis- 
cussed  and  defined  below  in connection  with  estimating  the potential  labor 
force.  Equation  2 is used to calculate  the second  row of the table, which 
shows that the changing  mix of the labor force accounts  for about one- 
quarter  of the difference  between  the present  estimates  of the cyclical  ef- 
fects on labor  force participation  for 1976 and those cited by Okun.  The 
remaining  difference-between 0.6 percent  and the 0.82 percent  average 
for 1955-60 in the present  estlinates-is  attributable  to the lagged un- 
employment  effects and other differences  in the form of the estimating 
equations. 
EXPLAINING  THE  TRENDS 
Several  attempts  were  made  to get behind  the time trends  shown  in the 
table 1 equations  in the hope of improving  the specifications  and  of better 
identifying  the cyclical  effects  and also of providing  a stronger  foundation 
for projecting  future participation  rates. First, the proportion  of black 
males  in the adult  age groups  was introduced  as an explanatory  variable, 
but did not account  for the decline  in these groups.  Furthermore,  partici- 
pation  rates  for both  black  and  white  adult  males  declined  in recent  years. 
Second,  the proportion  of 16- to 19-year-olds  enrolled  in school was a 
significant  variable  in explaining  participation  of females  in this age  group. 
However,  it left both the time trend  starting  in 1967 and the unemploy- 
ment  effects  almost  identical  to those in the table 1 equations,  although  it 
reduced  the time  trend  before 1970. The enrollment  variable  was insignifi- 
cant  for teenage  males.  Finally,  the ratio  of college enrollments  of women 
and men was tried as a proxy for the sociological changes affecting 
women's  participation.  But it resulted  in substantially  higher standard 
errors  for the equation  than  the time  trend  did and  took on the wrong  sign 
in some  cases. 20  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
Table 2.  Labor Force Par  ticipation  Rates of Women, by Marital and 
Parental Status, and Age Groups, 1967 and 1975 
Percent 
Married  women,  Other  ever-  Never- 
Parental  status  husband  present  married  women  married  women 
and age group  1967  1975a  1967  1975a  1967  1975S 
With  no children  under  18 
16-19  43.3  61.9  48.9  47.0  37.2  49.6 
20-24  67.2  84.2  75.6  82.9  70.3  72.4 
25-34  70.4  84.2  69.9  86.0  80.9  84.6 
35-44  59.2  65.6  54.8  82.3  74.5  79.8 
45 and over  31.8  34.6  29.7  29.3  47.4  49.3 
With  children  6-17 
16-19  ..  ...  ...  ...  ...  .. 
20-24  45.2b  42.0  39.1  64.3  ...  ... 
25-34  49.0  60.3  72.9  77.0  ... 
35-44  46.1  57.5  68.55b  75.0  o  ... 
45 and over  41.3  47.1  59.8  60.5  ... 
With  children  under  6 
16-19  20.9  34.9  27.6  44.2 
20-24  29.3  40.8  52.2  64.5  ...  ... 
25-34  25.5  39.0  52.5  59.2  ...  ... 
35-44  26.9  35.5  51.8  47.1  ...  ... 
45 and over  26.8  31.7  47.5  53.3  ... 
Source: U S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  1975 data are adjusted for the difference between the aggr-egate  unemployment rates for  1967 and 
1975 usinig the equations developed in the text. Unlike the other data in this paper, the data in this table 
are not adjusted for the 1970 Census and are not adjusted to an establishment-employment  basis. 
b. The 1966 value was used dtue  to an apparent error in the 1967 figures. 
Family  Status. For women,  family  status  has been an important  factor 
determining  labor  force  participation.  The  importance  of changes  in status 
for the recent  changes  in participation  trends  was examined  with  the data 
in table  2. There,  participation  rates are given  for 1967 and 1975 for the 
female  population  disaggregated  according  to three  categories  for marital 
status,  three  for number  of children,  and  five  for age. To eliminate  cyclical 
effects  in comparing  the two years,  the raw data for 1975 were adjusted 
for the difference  in weighted  unemployment  between 1967 and 1975 
using  the equations  of table 1. Participation  rates  rose between  1967 and 
1975 in almost  all of the thirty-three  cells but rose only a little  for women 
20 and  over  who  had  never  been  married  and  for  women  45 and  over. 
The proportion  of women  in different  cells has shifted  along with the 
changes  in behavior  for each  cell. Table  3 shows  the relative  importance  of 
these two sources  of total change: (1)  the change  that would have oc- George L. Perry  21 
Table 3.  Population-Shift  and Behavioral-Change  Effects on Labor Force 
Participation  Rates of Women, by Age Group 
Percentage  points 
Change  in participation  rates,  1967-75,  by source 
Change  Shift 
within  family-  among  family- 
Age group  Total  characteristic  cells"  characteristic  cells 
16-19  12.9  12.7  0.1 
20-24  13.6  8.9  4.7 
25-34  16.2  11.9  4.8 
35-44  12.1  10.2  2.2 
45 and over  2.0  2.0  0.0 
All groups  8.7  6.9  1.8 
Source: Calculated from table 2. Figures are rounded. 
a.  For explanation, see text. 
curred  had the population  distribution  among  cells remained  unchanged 
while  participation  rates  in each cell changed  as they  actually  did  between 
1967 and 1975 (in the table, this part of the total change is labeled 
"change  within  family-characteristic  cells"); (2)  the change  that would 
have occurred  had participation  rates in each cell remained  unchanged 
while the population  distribution  among  cells changed  as it actually  did 
between 1967 and 1975 (in the table, this part of the total change is 
labeled  "shift  among  family-characteristic  cells")  . 
Although  the effect  of the second  kind  of change-in  the distribution  of 
family status with participation  rates fixed-is  noticeable, particularly 
for the  groups  between  20 and  34, the changes  in behavior  within  each  cell 
between  the two years  is easily  the more  important  source  of the observed 
shift  in participation  rates.  Of course,  both sources  of change  can  reflect  a 
common  sociological  trend.  A woman's  decision  not to marry  or not to 
have  children  can  have  the same  motivations  that  lead  her to join the work 
force. 
The  results  in tables  2 and  3 permit  no hard  conclusions,  but they  invite 
a few conjectures.  First,  the  far  greater  importance  of changes  in participa- 
tion  for a given  group  relative  to population  shifts  among  groups  suggests 
some permanence  in recent developments.  Even if the distribution  of 
various  kinds of family status  moves back toward  its earlier  pattem be- 
cause  marriage  and child-bearing  turn  out to have been postponed  rather 
than forgone,  large changes  in participation  would remain.  Second, the 
uneven  distribution  of changes  in participation  suggests  that  they  are  based 
on sociological  factors  rather  than  on shorter-run  economic  developments 22  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
inflation  and real earnings.  All groups  should have been affected  by 
economic  developments,  yet only women  under  45 displayed  substantial 
changes  in behavior,  either  on balance  or within  family-characteristic  cells. 
This finding  is supported  by the time trends  in the equations  of table 1. 
Third,  there  is room  for a substantial  further  increase  in overall  participa- 
tion rates  of women.  The age groups  that  have been affected  will continue 
in the working-age  population  for many  years, while those 45 years and 
over who have not been affected  (or who show a declining  trend  in the 
results  of table  1  ) will  be leaving  it. Women  25 to 34 without  children  may 
have approached  normal  limits  in their  participation  since the participa- 
tion  rates  of never-married  women  are  matched  by those  for the two other 
cells. But apparently  there is still scope for higher  participation  among 
women  with children  if their  behavior  continues,  as it has over the past 
decade,  to narrow  the gap between those with and without a husband 
present. 
THE  ROLE  OF  WAGES  AND  PRICES 
The model of labor force participation  of equation 1 is obviously 
incomplete.  One  of its sins  of omission  is its failure  to take  explicit  account 
of wages  and  prices.  I tried  to incorporate  them,  drawing  on an alternative 
model of participation  developed  by Wachter.10  The variables  he used 
were  the real  wage,  W,  and  the price  level,  P, and  moving  averages  of their 
past values, W* and P*, which were used to represent  the "permanent" 
wage  and  the "perceived"  level of prices.  Wachter  uses the perceived  real 
wage  and  the  ratio  of the current  to the perceived  real  wage  as explanatory 
variables  to model  the effects  on labor  supply  of permanent  and  transitory 
movements  in real wages.  The ratio of the current  to the perceived  price 
level  measures  the  money  illusion  that  fools workers  into entering  the labor 
market.  The  expected  sign  on the price-ratio  variable  is positive,  while  the 
expected  sign on the two wage variables  depends on the group whose 
participation  is being  analyzed. 
In order  to examine  their effects on participation,  the variables  that 
Wachter  snecified  were added  to those of equation  1  .1  Table 4 gives the 
10. Wachter,  "Labor  Supply Model." 
11.  W* is an eight-year moving average of  W, the real wage, defined as total 
private nonagricultural  adjusted hourly earnings deflated by P, the consumer price 
index; and 
P* =  O.4P  -4- O.3P(-l)  +  O.2P(-2)  +  O.IP(-3). bio  U  o  c0  G  r  o  -  o 
~~4)  ~~~~  ~  n  O  C-40  ,-%  5  5 
4)4 E  .a  I  Ii  I  I  ?i  I 
*.  <  CM  00  N.  Xt  0  -  If 
4)L.  e  0  0O  0  0 
S:2z  *t  m  o  N  O  W  N  O 
'  If)  I~  I  -  '0  |'r0  CM  0  C)  C)  r  0  | 
4  -  -  ^M  &  ^  '  O  N  CD 
? 
ti  X  O  I~~  O 
I  I  ;  D  o  ,C: 
4)  eS  If)  i  M  IM  If)  C)  cj  C-I 
t ~  ~  ~ 
.  |. 
.  .  o.o  r:<?C 
.53  1  fl.  I  S  I  C  i  'i  O  O-  O  1-  .  O 
m  a S  o  v)-  M  -o  -0  -  h zC 
C)) 
O~~~~~~~~%  |0  tn  | 
0  OO 
F-  Zo~- 
Q 
X  >  ~~~~~~~~N  W  PWtO?Cd  N 
z4  < E  O  I  g  I *  4)  4)  I  .  *  a  Di ) 
4>  ~  ~  |1C  -l 
40  _  _|_|_| 
0 
C8  2  r  m  .0 
M  tn  en  in  *|)  |  ?Q  Q14 
CD  00  M  t0  |M  Cm 
o  0 
~~~  q  0~~~~~~W  0  '  4) 
~~~f)~~~~~~C  M  .  ~  ~  ~  . 
0'  K~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~K~~~ 
4)  '-  %-)  k0n4  ~4 
I  I  CM~~~  '-~  i  I101 
4)  ii  I4-d14--.14-14-.k  1  t  4  O  4 
w-4  V-1m  1* W 24  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
estimates  resulting  from  fitting  this  equation  to annual  data  over  the period 
1954-76 for those  demographic  groups  that  Wachter  used  in his own  tests. 
The years  before  1954 were  unavailable  because  of the long lags required 
in forming  the variables.  But the inflation  since his stopping point of 
1968 should  provide  a good test of the role of wages and prices in the 
model  for  labor  supply. 
The results  in table 4 support  the basic model of equation  1 in most 
respects.  Each of the new variables  was included  if its t statistic  was at 
least 1.0. Despite  this lenient  criterion,  most of the variables  reflecting  the 
relative  real wage were omitted as insignificant.  Only two of six actual 
real-wage  variables  were significant  and correctly signed, while four 
others  had  significant  coefficients  with  incorrect  signs.'2  The inflation  vari- 
ables  were  much  more  successful,  with  significant  coefficients  appearing  in 
five  of the  eight  equations. 
As the last two columns  of table 4 show, the addition  of the wage and 
price  variables  had only a modest effect on the cyclical response  of the 
model.  They do produce  noticeable  changes  in the time trends  for some 
groups.  In particular,  compared  with the results of table 1, the trend 
growth  in participation  is noticeably  faster for females  between 20 and 
44 and  for  male  teenagers. 
CHANGING  PERMANENCE  OF  PARTICIPATION 
One final  hypothesis  concerning  cyclical  response  was checked  out. If 
the rise  in participation  rates  of the past decade  was part  of a more  perma- 
nent attachment  to work on the part of secondary  workers,  the cyclical 
responsiveness  of participation  could be expected  to decline.  This would 
mean  that  the average  coefficients  on unemployment  shown  in table 1 were 
too large  for the labor  force of recent  years.  But table 5, which  gives the 
unemployment  coefficients  of the table 1 equations  separately  for the 
1954-65 and 1966-76  periods, suggests  that this is not the case. The 
coefficients  are actually  larger  (more negative) for six of the ten popula- 
tion  groups  in the  latter  period. 
12. Since the signs on the wage and relative-wage variables vary according to 
which theory applies,  I have shown all significant  coefficients  and have used Wachter's 
criteria  as expressed  in his results  and discussion  to determine  what signs are expected. George L. Perry  25 
Table 5.  Comparison  of Cyclical Responsiveness  of Labor Force 
Participation,  by Age-Sex Group, 1954-65 and 1966-76 
Sum of unemployment  coefficients 
Sex and  age group  1954-65  1966-76 
Males 
16-19  -2.69  -3.04 
20-24  -0.80  -1.47 
25-34  0.03  -0.12 
65 and over  -2.38  -3.03 
Females 
16-19  -2.95  -3.09 
20-24  -3.10  -2.37 
25-34  -2.23  -1.67 
35-44  -1.79  -1.29 
45-54  -0.23  -0.52 
55-64  -1.00  -0.52 
Source: Equations of table I were used, with estimated effects of right-hand variable other than unem- 
ployment subtracted  from the dependent variable and the remaining unemployment effect estimated sepa- 
rately for each period shown. 
Potential  Labor  Input 
Since their unemployment  effects seemed reasonably  stable through 
time and were much the same whether  or not price and wage variables 
were  included,  the participation  equations  of table 1 were used to adjust 
for the cyclical  variations  in the size and composition  of the labor force 
and employment.  For this purpose,  a constant  weighted  unemployment 
rate of 3.32 percent-its  value in mid-1955-was  taken as an index of 
potential,  with cyclical variations  measured  by deviations  of weighted 
unemployment  from  this  constant  level. 
DEFINING  POTENTIAL 
Since  a definition  of potential  is needed and is being introduced  here, 
this is as good a place as any to explain  the choice. Because everyone  is 
used to it and understands  it, I depart  only reluctantly  from a constant 
conventional  unemployment  rate  as the index  of the economy  at potential. 
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represents  unemployed  labor in efficiency  units. And its counterpart, 
weighted  employment,  has proven  useful in aggregate  production  func- 
tions. 
One might  want to define  potential  by a measure  that represented  a 
"noninflationary"  level of utilization  or unemployment.  An appropriate 
level of constant  weighted  unemployment  is a step  in that  direction.  But it 
would  be misleading  to think  of such  a measure  as defining  a noninflation- 
ary operating  point with any precision,  and it is not meant to serve that 
purpose. Even when I first used it, I noted that weighted unemployment 
was an imperfect  measure  of overall labor market  tightness  because it 
failed  to account  for the changing  dispersion  of unemployment  rates.  And 
everyone  now  knows  that  inflation  can arise  from  causes  other  than  overly 
tight labor markets,  and that once under way, it can continue despite 
enormous  slack in capacity and high unemployment.  Furthermore,  if 
policies  directly  affect  the price-wage  level-through structural  measures 
aimed  at high unemployment  areas,  incomes  policies, or microeconomic 
policies-the link  between  weighted  unemployment  and  inflation  is weak- 
ened  further. 
Analysis  of potential  output provides  information  about the relation 
between output and unemployment  and about the cyclical and trend 
characteristics  of productivity,  labor  input,  and  output  in the economy.  An 
understanding  of these relationships  is important  to any macroeconomic 
investigation.  The concept  of weighted  unemployment  that is used in this 
analysis  approximates  overall  tightness  in labor  markets  in a way that is 
useful  for studying  inflation  and certainly  more useful than conventional 
unemployment.  But using a level of constant  weighted  unemployment  as 
a base for measuring  potential  does not imply that that base gives the 
optimal  operating  level oI the economy  at all times,  or that inflation  will 
always  be absent or declining  if that rate is maintained.  Choosing  the 
optimal  level  that  balances  risks  of inflation  against  costs  of unemployment 
and  underutilization  will continue  to be an issue  for year-by-year  analysis 
and  for debate  within  the political  process. 
POTENTIAL  EMPLOYMENT  AND  HOURS 
The potential  labor  force in each age-sex  group (Li) in each  year  was 
calculated  by adding  to the actual  labor  force the cyclical  increment  pre- George  L. Perry  27 
dicted  by the table 1 equations.  The unemployment  rate at potential  for 
each  group  was  then  estimated  using  the  restriction  that 
Us  + Li;- Li  Ul 
Li  n-  Li 
for each group,  where U is unemployment  and bars over the variables 
represent  values  at potential;  that is to say, the ratio of the actual  "total" 
unemployment  rate (which  includes  the shortfall  in participants)  to the 
unemployment  rate at potential  is the same  for each group.  The constant 
a was calculated  for each year from the constraint  that the weighted  un- 
employment  rate  was  0.0332: 
a?3gihiw  i  =  0.0332,  'Li 
where  the  fl  are  the relative  labor  force  weights  of 1966; the hi and  wi are 
the hour and wage weights,  respectively;  and E/3ih,wi =  1. Employment 
at  potential  for  each  group  is  Es =  i -  L;  total  employment  is 
E =  YEl; and total weighted employment is WE =  Yhjw,Ej. 
Along the potential  path, the unemployment  rate has risen gradually 
over the past twenty  years,  as shown  in table 6. There,  the armed  forces 
are excluded  to make the data comparable  with the faamiliar  published 
unemployment  rates.13  The  unemployment  rate  at potential  is estimated  as 
4.9 percent  in 1976, the same as CEA's estimate, compared  with 4.0 
percent  in the mid-1950s.  Unemployment  was clearly  below its potential 
level in two sustained  wartime  stretches,  from 1951 through 1953 and 
from 1966 through  1969. It was about at potential  in 1955-57  and in 
1965 and 1973. In the fifteen  remaining  years,  unemployment  was above 
potential  levels,  with  the  biggest  excess  occurring  in the  last  two years. 
Employment  Gaps. Table 7 shows the percent  employment  gap esti- 
mated  for each  demographic  group  per point  of aggregate  unemployment. 
The relative  gains  in employment  experienced  by each group  are slightly 
different  in 1960-61 and 1975-76 because  of differences  in their  relative 
shares  of total employment  and unemployment  in the two periods.  But in 
13. In this table and all subsequent  tables with economic variables on the poten- 
tial path, potential values are given by three-year  centered moving averages of the 
directly calculated potential variables. This removes some of the irregularities  that 
would otherwise arise from residuals in the estimated equations that are used to 
calculate potential magnitudes, and from abrupt  changes introduced  by time trends. 28  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
Table 6.  Conventional  Unemployment  Rates, 
Actual and Potential, 1950-76 
Percent 
Actual minus 
Year  Actual  Potential  potentiala 
1950  5.2  4.0  1.2 
1951  3.1  3.9  -0.8 
1952  2.8  3.7  -0.9 
1953  2.7  3.6  -0.9 
1954  5.3  3.8  1.6 
1955  4.2  4.0  0.3 
1956  4.0  4.0  0.0 
1957  4.1  4.0  0.2 
1958  6.7  4.0  2.7 
1959  5.4  4.1  1.3 
1960  5.4  4.1  1.3 
1961  6.6  4.1  2.5 
1962  5.5  4.2  1.2 
1963  5.6  4.3  1.3 
1964  5.1  4.4  0.8 
1965  4.4  4.4  0.0 
1966  3.6  4.4  -0.8 
1967  3.8  4.4  -0.6 
1968  3.6  4.5  -0.9 
1969  3.5  4.5  -1.0 
1970  5.0  4.5  0.4 
1971  6.0  4.6  1.3 
1972  5.6  4.8  0.9 
1973  4.8  4.8  0.0 
1974  5.6  4.8  0.8 
1975  8.5  4.8  3.7 
1976  7.7  4.9  2.8 
Sources: Actual from Bureau of Labor Statistics, with rates adjusted for Census-year  changes and 1967 
definition changes. The calculation of unemployment rates at potential is described in the text. 
a.  Calculated  from unrounded unemployment rates. 
both  periods  the  story  is much  like Okun's  calculations  based  on my earlier 
analysis  of potential.'4 
Employment  Composition. Through  time,  the changing  demographic 
composition  of employment  has been the result  of two developments:  the 
changing  composition  of the labor  force and  changing  relative  unemploy- 
ment rates. Since, for the most part, those groups  that have grown the 
14. Okun,  "Upward  Mobility,"  pp. 216-17. George  L. Perry  29 
Table 7.  Employment  Gaps by Age-Sex Group  per Point of the 
Unemployment  Rate, 1960-61 and 1975-76 
Percent 
Sex and  age groups  1960-61  1975-76 
Males 
16-19  5.4  5.5 
20-24  2.6  3.0 
25-34  1.2  1.2 
35-44  0.9  0.8 
45-54  1.1  0.8 
55-64  1.3  0.8 
65 and over  2.5  2.3 
Females 
16-19  5.3  5.9 
20-24  3.7  3.7 
25-34  2.8  2.6 
35-44  2.3  2.0 
45-54  1.6  1.3 
55-64  1.5  1.4 
65 and over  0.7  0.9 
Source: Author's estimates based on participation equations and calculation of potential employment 
described  in the text. 
fastest  have also experienced  a deterioration  in unemployment  rates  rela- 
tive  to other  groups,  the composition  of employment  has changed  slightly 
less than  the composition  of the labor force. The employment  along the 
economy's  potential  path differs  from the actual to the extent that the 
cyclical  employment  gains shown  in table 7 are not proportional  among 
the  various  demographic  groups.  Tab'le  8 gives  employment  profiles  of the 
economy,  showing  total  employment  and  its demographic  distribution  for 
the actual  economy  and the estimated  economy  at potential.  The estimate 
for 1981 in the  table  was  obtained  by projecting  participation  rates  beyond 
1976,  making  a conservative  projection  of the participation-rate  equations 
in table 1. Rather  than  projecting  a continuation  of the estimated  trends, 
which  would  maintain  a constant  percentage  change,  the average  annual 
absolute  change  in participation  rates  over  the past  ten years  was extended 
into the future.  The resulting  participation  rates for each demographic 
group  were  multiplied  by 1981 populations  to obtain  1981 projections  of 
the  labor  force.  These,  in turn,  were  multiplied  by 1976 potential  employ- 
ment  rates  to obtain  1981 employment  totals  for each  group. 
The work  force is maturing.  The large increases  in employment  pro- 30  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
Table 8.  Actual and Potential Employment  Profiles of the Economy, 
Selected Years 1955-81 
Projected 
Description  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1976  1981 
Actual  economy 
Unemployment  rate 
(percent),  4.2  5.4  4.4  5.0  8.5  7.7  ... 
Total  employment 
(millions)a  65.8  67.9  73.4  81.9  86.4  89.0 
Employment  propor- 
tion (percent) 
65 and over  5.0  4.7  4.0  3.8  3.2  3.0  ... 
16-19  6.4  6.6  7.5  8.0  8.5  8.5  ... 
20-24  10.7  10.3  11.9  14.0  14.3  14.5 
25-64 
Female  23.0  24.3  24.8  26.1  27.5  28.0  ... 
Male  54.8  54.1  51.8  48.0  46.5  46.0 
Potential  economy 
Unemployment  rate 
(percent)a  4.0  4.2  4.4  4.5  4.9  4.9  5.1 
Total employment 
(millions)a  66.3  69.7  74.0  82.2  92.0  94.6  106.2 
Employment  propor- 
tion (percent) 
65 and over  5.1  4.7  4.0  3.8  3.1  3.0  2.6 
16-19  6.5  6.9  7.5  8.1  9.4  9.4  8.9 
20-24  10.8  10.5  11.9  14.1  14.9  15.1  15.4 
25-64 
Female  23.0  24.4  24.8  26.1  27.4  27.9  30.0 
Male  54.7  53.6  51.7  48.0  45.1  44.6  43.1 
Source: Actual-Bureau  of Labor Statistics; other-calculations  underlying table 7. Figures are rounded. 
a.  Unemployment rates exclude armed forces; employment totals and proportions include them. 
portions  for the groups  aged 16 to 24 that  have  been occurring  since 1960 
are  over except  for the normal  expansion  in their  share  of jobs as cyclical 
unemployment  is reduced (unless special government  job programs  add 
to their  expected  job total). The rise in the employment  share  of women 
aged  25 to 64 will actually  accelerate  as more  women  enter  this  mature  age 
group  and participation  rates continue  rising  although  at a more modest 
rate than in recent years. Finally, the share of men 25 to 64 in total 
employment  declines  more  slowly  than  in recent  years  along  the potential 
path, although  the decline is substantial  between 1976 actual and 1981 
potential.  These relative changes suggest  that the specific problems  of George L. Perry  31 
teenagers  and  young  adults  may lessen,  while adult  women  may be in for 
a relatively  more  difficult  period  in the labor  market  as their  numbers  con- 
tinue  to increase  sharply. 
Potential Average Hours.  Average  hours worked per year per  em- 
ployee  fluctuate  cyclically  and,  in addition,  have  been  on a clear  downward 
trend  throughout  the  postwar  period.  Both  the cyclical  and  secular  changes 
reflect  the operation  of several  forces. Up through  the mid-1950s, the 
normal  workweek  in manufacturing  was being  reduced  to 40 hours.  Since 
then, a gradual  reduction  in economy-wide  average  hours  has continued, 
only  in part  as the  result  of the growing  number  of workers  who  voluntarily 
seek  part-time  work.  My previous  attempt  at explaining  the trend  in hours 
adjusted  for the changing  composition  of employment  still left a major 
portion  unexplained.'5  So this  time  I have  ignored  that  complication.  Since 
the subsequent  analysis will concentrate  on the private nonresidential 
nonfarm  business sector-hereafter, simply the "business  sector"-for 
the period  starting  in 1954, the equation  was fitted to average  hours in 
that  sector  (AHB) from  1954 to 1976: 
(3)  log AHB  =  3.72 -  0.494u*-  0.00214T54-0.0031OT66-  0.00885DT. 
(-5.5)  (-8.1)  (-5.6)  (-4.3) 
Standard  error = 0.00324; Durbin-Watson  = 2.1. 
Three  time-trend  variables  were  needed: T54 starts  at 1 in 1954 and rises 
by 1 each  year;  T66 starts  at 1 in 1966 and  rises  by 1 each  year;  and  DT is 
1 in 1966 and 2 in 1967 and subsequent  years. Using a special time 
dummy  for 1966 and 1967 is unsatisfying,  but the data demand  it. I have 
previously  discussed  my attempt  to get behind  this  discontinuity,  conclud- 
ing then that the drop in hours should  be regarded  as a permanent  shift 
downward  in the hours  trend.'6  Now, with  seven  more  years  of data  avail- 
able, that  conclusion  seems  reaffirmed.  Nonetheless,  estimating  the cycli- 
cal and  secular  behavior  of hours  with an equation  such as 3 remains  one 
of the  least  satisfactory  steps  in the  analysis  of potential. 
The coefficient  on u* indicates  that  each  extra  point  of weighted  unem- 
ployment  is accompanied  by nearly  0.5 percent  lower average  hours in 
the business  sector.  In 1976, that corresponds  approximately  to 0.4 per- 
cent extra average  hours per point of conventional  unemployment.  The 
trend  terms  indicate  that, at present,  average  hours  are  falling  by just  over 
15. Perry,  "Labor  Force Structure." 
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0.5 percent  a year along  the potential  path. With  the changes  in relative 
employment  among  demographic  groups  just  projected,  this  rate  of decline 
could  lessen,  but  the equation  provides  no way  of estimating  that  effect. 
Potential Weighted  Hours. The ingredients  for calculating  potential 
weighted  hours are now at hand. Employment  in each age-sex group 
was allocated  to the business  sector  according  to the ratio in each year of 
total employment  in that sector  to economy-wide  employment.  Employ- 
ment  in the business  sector  in each age-sex  group,  EBi, was then  weighted 
by relative  hours  and  wages  and summed  to get weighted  employment  for 
the sector, WEB,  and adjusted  by average  weekly  hours to get weighted 
(total) hours,  H, the basic measure  of labor input.'7  The difference  in 
employment  between  actual  and  potential  was all assigned  to the business 
sector  and  the procedure  repeated  to obtain  potential  weighted  hours,  H, 
for each  year.'8 
The average  annual  growth  rates in principal  indicators  of potential 
labor  input  are shown  in table 9 over  half-decade  intervals  and 1970-76. 
The last column  projects  the next five  years.  The growth  rate of the labor 
force  and  employment  more  than  doubles  in the 1965-76 period  from  the 
previous  decade, and growth  in potential  employment  accelerates  even 
more in the business sector than it does in the whole economy. The 
growth  rate of weighted  hours  in the business  sector does not speed up 
nearly  as much as employment,  both because of the sharp  slowdown  in 
average  hours  worked  during  that period  and  because  a large  part of the 
employment  acceleration  consists  of workers  with low hours and wages. 
But with average  hours declining  more slowly in the 1970-76 inteival, 
potential  weighted  hours  grow  more than  twice as fast as in the 1965-70 
period. Because the potential employment increase continues to  be 
relatively  concentrated  in workers  with low weights (and average  hours 
decline  faster  than  in the pre-1965  intervals),  the annual  growth  of poten- 
tial weighted  hours  is a full percent  slower  than the growth  of potential 
employment  over the latest  interval,  a much  larger  difference  than in the 
pre-1965  periods. 
For the 1976-81 projection  period,  total employment  and  its composi- 
17. The following formula was used to assign the appropriate  weights consistent 
with the total hours of employment: 
H = AHB  h  EBi  hiwiEBi.  M  hiEBi 
18. A justification  for treating the rest of the economy as noncyclical is provided 
by Okun's  results  in "Upward  Mobility,"  pp. 218-24. George L. Perry  33 
Table 9.  Potential Growth  Rates of Labor Input Measures, 
Selected Intervals,  1950-81 
Percent  per year 
Projected 
Measure  1950-55  1955-60  1960-65  1965-70  1970-76  1976-81 
Labor force  1.43  1.01  1.29  2.17  2.39  2.08 
Employment 
Total  1.45  0.97  1.23  2.14  2.31  2.07 
Total civilian  1.05  1.17  1.22  2.10  2.59  ... 
Business  1.46  1.21  1.11  2.30  2.87  2.07 
Hours 
Total business  1.15  0.95  0.84  1.41  2.33  1.53 
Weighted  total  business  1.06  0.81  0.59  0.94  1.81  1.39 
Source: Calculated as described in the text. 
tion  are  taken  from  table  8 while  average  hours  are  projected  using  the  rate 
of decline  given  by equation  3. The ratio  of business  employment  to total 
employment  was  maintained  at its potential  level  in 1976. This  assumption 
is probably  a conservative  projection  of the portion  of employment  in the 
high-productivity  business  sector since the ratio of business  employment 
to either  total  or total  civilian  employment  generally  rose  in the past. 
Productivity 
The relationship  between  labor  input  and output  in the business  sector 
provides  the  basis  for examining  recent  productivity  behavior  and  estimat- 
ing a potential  output  path  for the econiomy.  I start  with  the model  relating 
output and weighted  labor hours that I used previously  for the whole 
economy'9  and apply it here to the business  sector.20  I shall turn to the 
issue  of capital  adequacy  below. 
The basic model starts out with the proposition  that weighted  labor 
productivity  grows  exponentially  along  the  potential  path: 
(4)  Q =  Bert 
19. Perry,  "Labor  Force Structure." 
20. Nonresidential nonfarm business product equals total business product less 
product originating in farming and services of the housing stock. The scope is the 
same as in Edward  F. Denison, Accounting for U.S. Economic Growth (Brookings 
Institution, 1974),  and corresponds as closely as possible to the concept for labor 
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where Q is output in the business  sector, r is the annual growth  rate, 
t is a time index, and the bars over variables  indicate  potential  values. 
This  can  be modified  to allow  for a break  in the  growth  trend: 
(S)  Q  =  Be(r tl+r2t2). 
FI 
Cyclical  deviations  of productivity  from  its trend  are  expressed  by 
(6)  Q=  (Hj 
Q  H 
where  /3 >  1 if, as expected,  productivity  is higher  the higher  the level of 
actual hours or actual output relative to potential. Previous work has 
shown  that  some lags exist in this cyclical  relation,  and they are allowed 
for  by modifying  6 to 
(7a)  H_  _ Q/Q-p1 
H  Q2 L(QIQ)_12 
or to 
(7b)  Q  _  (ftryH/HJ1 
Q  VHJ (/)1 
Combining  equations  5 and either 7a or 7b to eliminate  Q leads to the 
model  used  for statistical  estimation. 
RECENT  BEHAVIOR  OF  PRODUCTIVITY 
In 1974, at the start  of the big recession,  actual  labor productivity  in 
the business  sector (in terms of conventional  hours, not the weighted 
hours  that  are  used  throughout  most  of this  analysis)  fell 3.6 percent.  This 
was  not only a huge  decline,  but also the first  one of any size in productiv- 
ity since  the  war.  Partly  making  up for this,  productivity  rose in the  follow- 
ing year a substantial  1.8 percent  despite  the deepening  recession.  How 
much should  the behavior  of productivity  in 1974 influence  any assess- 
ment  of the  longer-run  characteristics  of the economy? 
There is ample evidence that businessmen  misjudged  the severity  of 
the downturn  for a long time.  They  kept  expanding  employment  long after 
output  fell. And they continued  to build up inventories  long after final 
sales  collapsed.  Their  optimism  may  have  been encouraged  by the govern- 
ment  and  the press,  both of which  continued  to foster  the impression  that 
the economy  was  experiencing  an "energy  spasm"  rather  than  a true  reces- George L. Perry  35 
Table  10. Two  Equations  Relating  Output  and  Labor  Input, 
with  and  without  Trend  Break 
Coefficient,  No trend  break  Trend  break  in 1969 
regression  statistic,  and  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation 
structural  characteristic  JO.  P  10.2b  JQ.ja  10J. 
Coefficient 
ao  -4.938  -8.102  -5.279  -8.113 
a,  0.0163  0.0267  0.0179  0.0279 
(20.5)  (72.4)  (13.5)  (43.3) 
a2  0.609  1.573  0.651  1.438 
(20.9)  (17.6)  (16.5)  (14.0) 
a3  -0.087  0.149  -0.093  0.150 
(-2.1)  (1.5)  (-2.3)  (1.7) 
a4  -0.0262  -0.0514  -0.0237  -0.0421 
(-3.6)  (-4.3)  (-3.3)  (-3.6) 
at,  ...  ...  -0.0019  -0.0042 
(-1.5)  (-1.6) 
Regression  statistic 
Standard  error  0.0064  0.0112  0.0062  0.0102 
Durbin-Watson  1.82  1.64  1.77  1.55 
Structural  characteristic  (percent) 
(dQ/Q)/(dH/IH) 
Permanent  1.64  1.57  1.54  1.44 
First year  1.92  1.72  1.79  1.59 
Weighted  productivity  trend  (percent) 
Before 1969  2.68  2.67  2.75  2.79 
Since 1969  2.68  2.67  2.46  2.37 
Weighted  productivity  residual  (actual  minus  predicted  in percentage  points) 
1976  -0.6  -1.1  -0.3  -0.4 
1975  -0.4  -1.2  -0.3  -0.9 
1973  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6 
Source: Estimated  from equations 10. 1 and 10.2 given in notes a and b below. The period of  estima- 
tion is 1954-76. 
a.  Equation 10.1: 
log (H)  ao +  alT54 +  a2 log (T)  +  as [log  (g)  -log  (H)g]  +  a4D74 +  a5T69, 
where H is weighted  total hours, H is potential weighted hours, Q is business-sector output, T54 and T69 
are time-trend  variables, and D74 is a dummy variable whereby 1974 is ignored. 
b.  Equation 10.2: 
log  ( Q)  =  ao +  a1T54  +  a2  log ()  _  +  as  [log  (_)  -  log (4_)  ]  +  a4D74 +  a5T69. 
sion. But regardless  of whether  these assessments  were reasonable  at the 
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in the economy. It seems best to acknowledge this, ignore 1974,  and in- 
vestigate recent productivity with the benefit of 1975 and 1976 develop- 
ments. In the estimates of the model shown in table  10, this is accom- 
plished by introducing a dummy variable, D74, for 1974. 
The two estimating equations reported in table  10 use,  alternatively, 
weighted hours (equation 10.1 from 5 and 7a)  and output (equation 10.2 
from 5 and 7b)  as dependent variables. The relation between the equation 
coefficients  and the structural  parameters of the miodel  are as follows: 
Equation  10.1  Equation  10.2 
Weighted  productivity 
growth  trend 
Without  trend  break  a1/a2  a, 
With  trend  break  (a, +  a5)/a2  a, +  a4 
Elasticity  of output 
gap to input  gap 
First  year  1/(a.  + a3)  a2 +  a, 
Permanent  1/a2  a2 
Constant  Productivity Trend.  To start with, consider the equations esti- 
mated with no break in the time trend over the 1954-76  period. The con- 
stant annual trend in weighted productivity is 2.68 percent and 2.67 per- 
cent in equations 10.1  and 10.2, respectively. Equation  10.1 predicts a 
permanent increase of  1.64  percent in output for each percent of  gap- 
closing increase in weighted hours, or a weighted productivity bonus of 
0.64 percent for each extra percent of weighted labor input. In the first 
year, the productivity bonus is 0.92 percent. 
The productivity residuals from the equations that are displayed in 
the last three rows of table 10 all show that productivity was overestimated 
in recent years by the historic equations, but not by much. To put these 
errors in perspective,  in  table  11  the  recent overpredictions from  the 
equations that were estimated without a break in the productivity trend 
are compared with residuals from earlier years. The table gives the residual 
for all years in which it exceeded the root mean-square error (RMSE)  of 
the equation for both forms. The residuals are shown as percentage short- 
falls in actual weighted productivity from the predictions of the equation. 
The  1974 shortfall is huge in both forms of the equation.  (It is not an 
estimated residual but the shortfall indicated by the dummy variable for 
that year.)  The shortfalls in subsequent years are substantial compared 
with the RMSE of the equations, but so were the errors in seven of the George L. Perry  37 
Table 11. Large Residuals  from Productivity  Equationsa 
Percent 
Year  Equation 10.1  Equation 10.2 
1956  -1.0  -1.8 
1957  -1.2  -1.9 
1958  1.1  1.4 
1960  -0.6  -1.3 
1969  -0.7  -1.2 
1971  0.6  1.1 
1972  0.8  1.5 
1974  - 2.  6b  _  5. lb 
1975  0  -1.2 
1976  -0.6  -1.1 
Source: Equations with unbroken trend from table 10. 
a.  All residuals with absolute values larger than the root mean-square error of the residuals from the 
equations are shown. 
b.  1974 was dummied out in the equations. The errors shown here are the errors implicit in the values 
of the dummy variable. 
c.  Under the stipulation of note a, the 1975 residual (0.4) was too small to be included. 
twenty  years  before 1974. By this standard,  the present  period  is unusual, 
but  not  unusually  unusual. 
The  recent  performance  of productivity  may appear  weaker  than  these 
shortfalls  indicate  because  of the substantial  positive  residuals  in 1971-72. 
Between 1972 and 1976, productivity  adjusted  for cyclical effects rose 
2.5 percent  less than expected  from equation 10.2 and 1.4 percent  less 
using  equation  10.1. Even these swings  are not extraordinary  when com- 
pared  with the swings  between  1957 and 1958, 1958 and 1960, or 1969 
and 1971. Of course, in those cases, we know that subsequent  years 
brought  the  errors  back  to zero;  we do not know  that  yet this  time. 
All in all, the equations  estimated  with a constant  productivity  trend 
can hardly  be rejected  on the basis of the economy's  recent  performance: 
1974 was an unusual  year  that requires  ad hoc explanations.  But most of 
the productivity  weakness  that remained  by 1976 is accounted  for as the 
normal  shortfall  of productivity  that accompanies  high unemployment. 
This  is especially  true  using  equation  10.1. On  the other  hand,  the constant 
productivity  trend  shown  in table 10 is slower  than the trend  that would 
have  been  estimated  with  equations  ending  several  years  earlier.  The pos- 
sibility  of a slowdown  in the  trend  deserves  further  exploration. 
Slowdown in Productivity Trend. The way to maximize one's concern 
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estimated  through  1973 shows  a 3.1 percent  shortfall  in productivity  when 
projected  to 1976. But this  procedure  seems  biased  toward  discovering  a 
permanent  productivity  slowdown.  It seemed  better  to explore  the hypo- 
thesis  of a trend  break  by allowing  for one after  a fairly  recent  year with 
a small  prediction  error.  I chose 1969 to start  a new  trend  and  the  resulting 
estimates  are shown  in the right  half of table 10. The equation  10.1 form 
shows  a 0.3 point  slowdown  after 1968 in the productivity  trend,  and the 
equation  10.2 form a 0.4 point slowdown.  Compared  to the equations 
without  a trend  break, these equations  show faster productivity  trends 
before  1969 and smaller  cyclical  productivity  effects.  The new equations 
have slightly  lower standard  errors  than  those without  a trend  break  and 
show somewhat  smaller  prediction  errors  for 1975 and 1976. Equation 
10.1 estimated  with the broken trend shows not only small but stable 
residuals  in these  years  and  in 1973, suggesting  that  its trend  estimate  over 
that  interval  is close  to the mark. 
Possible  Sources  of a Trend  Break. In view of the mixed evidence  on 
recent  productivity  trends  provided  by the basic  model,  I looked  for some 
alteration  in the specification  that  would  help  resolve  the issue.  Like most 
other investigators,  I suspect that a more fully specified  model would 
include a role for the capital stock; but unlike some others, I did not 
choose  to force the capital  stock into the story  by constraining  it to enter 
the equations.  I tried  to find an explicit  role for it in this relationship  by 
adding,  in turn,  several  versions  of it to the basic  model and  estimating  its 
effect.  Expenditures  for pollution  abatement  were subtracted  from gross 
nonresidential  stocks in the nonfarm business sector. Structures  and 
equipment,  and equipment  separately,  each for the total sector and for 
manufacturing  separately,  were tried as capital-stock  measures,  but each 
failed  to enter  the  relationship  significantly. 
Another  possible  source  of a slowdown  in the productivity  trend  as I 
measure  it would  be that  the weighting  used for young  workers  overstates 
their  contribution  to output,  perhaps  because  firms  are  investing  in training 
them. Or more generally,  the wage weights may simply be inaccurate 
proxies for relative productivities.  However, neither the proportion  of 
teenagers  nor  the  proportion  of adult  males  was successful  as an additional 
explanatory  variable.  Since I could not settle to my own satisfaction  the 
question  of whether  a trend  break was appropriate,  I used results both 
with and without  the break  to form two separate  estimates  of potential 
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Potential  GNP 
Potential  business  output,  Q, was generated  by applying  the trend  pro- 
ductivity  estimates  from each form of equation  10.1 to the estimates  of 
potential  weighted  manhours  and anchoring  potential  output  by equating 
it to actual  output  in the middle  two quarters  of 1955; this is the bench- 
mark  first  established  by Okun  and widely  accepted  since.  Potential  GNP 
was then calculated  by adding  the difference  between actual GNP and 
business  output  in each year. This procedure  allows no change  between 
actual and potential  in either labor input or productivity  for the non- 
business  part  of GNP. 
For projecting  potential  GNP, the same two productivity  trends for 
the business  sector were extended  and combined  with the projection  of 
weighted  manhours  shown  in table 9. As noted earlier,  these projections 
assumed  that the business  sector would maintain  its 1976 share of total 
potential  employment.  The remaining  employment  was assigned  to the 
nonbusiness  portion  of GNP and the output  that would be forthcoming 
there  was  projected  using  a relation  estimated  from  the 1954-76 period: 
(8)  log QN =  0.163 +  0.488 log EN +  0.0256TS4, 
(2.0)  (8.7) 
Standard error =  0.0152;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.678;  p  =  0.60. 
where  QN and  EN are  output  and  employment  outside  the business  sector 
and T54 is a time-trend  dummy.  The variables  QN and EN cover the 
government  sector,  in which  there  is no productivity  growth  by definition; 
the services  of housing,  which are produced  without  any labor;  and agri- 
culture,  where  productivity  growth  is very  rapid.  This is such a mixed  bag 
that  I accepted  this  equation  without  question. 
The two estimates  of potential  GNP are shown in table 12, together 
with the CEA's revised estimates and the previous official estimates. 
Potential  I, which is based on the slower productivity  trend starting  in 
1969, grows  at a 3.9 percent  annual  rate  between  1976 and  the 1981 pro- 
jection;  potential  II, based  on the constant  productivity  trend,  grows  about 
0.2 point a year faster.  In this projection  period,  both measures  grow at 
about  the same  rate as they did in the 1970-76 interval.  In earlier  years, 
potential  I grew  slightly  faster than 31/2  percent  a year and potential  II 
slightly  slower. 40  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
Table 12. Potential Gross National Product, 
1954-76 and Projected, 1977-81 
Billions of 1972 dollars 
Potential  I  Potential  II  Official  estimates  of 
(produictivity  (unbrokent  potential  GNP gap 
trenid  break  productivity 
Year  in 1969)  trenzd)  Revised  Previous  Potential  I  Potential  II 
1954  633.0  633.3  629.7  634.4  -19.3  -19.6 
1955  654.8  654.8  651.4  656.6  0.0  0.0 
1956  674.3  673.9  673.9  679.6  -5.5  -5.1 
1957  697.6  696.9  697.2  703.4  -16.7  -16.0 
1958  722.2  721.0  721.3  728.0  -42.6  -41.5 
1959  749.5  748.0  746.2  753.5  -29.1  -27.6 
1960  777.2  775.1  771.9  779.9  -40.4  -  38.3 
1961  804.7  802.2  798.6  807.1  -49.4  -46.9 
1962  832.9  829.9  826.4  835.4  -33.8  -30.8 
1963  859.8  856.3  857.1  865.9  -29.1  -25.6 
1964  890.0  885.7  890.3  898.4  -15.5  -11.3 
1965  922.7  918.0  925.0  932.1  3.2  7.9 
1966  956.0  950.7  960.8  967.0  25.0  30.3 
1967  988.8  982.7  996.3  1,003.3  18.9  25.0 
1968  1,021.9  1,015.8  1,031.7  1,040.9  30.0  36.0 
1969  1,055.9  1,050.6  1,068.3  1,081.6  23.0  28.2 
1970  1,095.4  1,091.7  1,106.2  1,124.9  -20.1  -16.4 
1971  1,138.1  1,136.0  1,145.5  1,169.9  -30.6  -28.5 
1972  1,185.1  1,184.8  1,186.1  1,216.7  -14.0  -13.7 
1973  1,231.3  1,233.1  1,228.2  1,265.4  3.7  1.9 
1974  1,279.6  1,283.6  1,271.7  1,315.9  -65.6  -69.6 
1975  1,328.5  1,334.9  1,316.9  1,368.6  -136.7  -143.2 
1976  1,379.2  1,388.1  1,363.6  1,421.2  -114.6  -123.5 
1977  1,436.7  1,448.5  1,412.0  ...  ...  ... 
1978  1,492.3  1,507.0  1,462.1  ...  ... 
1979  1,550.4  1,568.3  1,513.9  ...  ...  ... 
1980  1,607.9  1,629.3  1,567.7  ... 
1981  1,668.3  1,693.3  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Sources: Potentials I and II are derived from table 10 equations and text equation 8; official estinmates 
are those of the Council of Economic Advisers from Economic  Report of the President,  Janiuary  1977, p. 54, 
except for 1977-81, which are from Peter K.  Clark, "A New  Estimate of Potential GNP"  (Council of 
Economic Advisers, January  27, 1977; processed); GNP gap is calculated by subtracting potential I or II, 
in the first two columns, from the corresponding actual GNP from Economic  Report, 1977, p. 54. 
OKUN  'S  LAW 
How well do Okun's  law and  the new estimates  of potential  GNP stack 
up against  one another?  Table 13 shows  several  equations  relating  gaps  in 
output  and in conventional  unemployment  rates. The latter are not the George  L. Perry  41 
Table 13.  Okun's Law Estimates Using Potential 
Gross National Product I and Ia 
Regression  statistic  Okun's 
Coefficient  -Ou' 
Equation  and  Standard  Durbin-  law co- 
potential  a1  a2  a3  error  Watson  efficient 
Equation 13. 1b 
Potential I  2.88  0.16  0.031  0.0072  1.4  3.04 
(21.0)  (1.1)  (4.3) 
Potential  II  2.94  0.14  0.034  0.0085  1.1  3.08 
(18.3)  (0.8)  (4.0) 
Equation  13.2c 
Potential  I  0.328  -0.010  ...  0.00238  1.6  3.05 
(28.3)  (-4.2)  ... 
Potential  II  0.319  -0.010  ...  0.00265  1.5  3.13 
(25.5)  (-3.8) 
Source: Based on data in tables 6 and 12. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
b.  Equation 13.1:  Q  Q  = ai(u-  i)  +  a2(U-u)-1  +  a3D74, 
Q 
where Q is real GNP and u the conventional unemployment rate; bars over variables indicate potential 
values; and D74 is a dummy variable for the year 1974. All equations were estimated with annual data 
over 1954-76. 
c.  Equation 13.2:  (u-u)  =  al  (Q  Q)  +  a2D74. 
difference  between actual unemployment  and 4.0  percent, but those 
unemployment  gaps measured  against  the changing  unemployment  rate 
that  defines  potential  as shown  in table 6. The  equations  use the output  gap 
and unemployment  gap alternatively  as dependent  variables.  When the 
lagged  unemployment  gaps are used as an added independent  variable, 
their  coefficients  are only about equal  to their standard  errors.  The year 
1974 is dummied  out on the grounds  described  earlier. The question 
usually  asked  of this  relation  is how  much  unemployment  will change  for a 
given  change  in the GNP gap.  In the present  estimates,  the answer  is much 
the same no matter  the form of the equation  in the table, although  the 
equations  in the  bottom  half  of the table  are  more  appropriate  in principle. 
Compared  with  Okun's  original  estimate  that  a 3.2 percent  output  gap  was 
associated  with one point of unemployment,  the present  estimates  of the 
Okun's  law coefficient  are 3.05 using  potential  I and 3.13 using  potential 
II. 
Both the intervals  1969-76 and 1973-76 are tracked  reasonably  well 
with  either  potential  estimate  and  its corresponding  Okun's  law coefficient. 42  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
In the longer  interval,  real GNP rose 17.2 percent  compared  with 30.6 
percent  for potential  I and 32.1 percent  for potential  II, thus opening  up 
output  gaps  of 11.2 and 12.6 percent,  respectively.  Okun's  law predicts  a 
widening  of 3.7 points  in the unemployment  rate gap using I and one of 
3.9 points using II; the actual rise was 3.7 points. Between 1973 and 
1976, the predicted  rise in the gap was 3.0 and 3.1 points, respectively, 
for potentials  I and  II; the actual  rise was 2.8 points.  Starting  from  a year 
like 1971, with the large  productivity  residual  noted earlier,  the relation 
does not perform  as well. The unemployment  gap widens by 1.5 points 
compared  with predictions  of 2.1 points from potential  I and 2.3 points 
from potential  II. I interpret  these results as generally  supporting  the 
potential  estimates  made here, and favoring slightly the estimates of 
potential  I. 
The GNP gap  for 1976 can be decomposed  into several  parts.  Closing 
the  unemployment  rate  gap  of 2.8 points  would  increase  total employment 
by 6.0 percent  while expanding  the labor force by 2.9 percent.  Employ- 
ment  in the  business  sector  would  rise  8.6 percent  and  average  hours  would 
increase  1.2 percent,  for a total rise of 9.9 percent  in (unweighted)  hours. 
Together  with a 2.6 percent  improvement  in productivity  in the business 
sector  conventionally  measured,  these  increases  would  close the 12.3 per- 
cent gap  in 1976 business  output  estimated  using  potential  I. With  poten- 
tial  II, productivity  in the business  sector  would  be 3.5 percent  higher  than 
it was  in fact,  closing  the 13.3 percent  business  output  gap  in that  estimate. 
POTENTIAL  ESTIMATES  COMPARED 
The  new  CEA  estimates  of the 1976 level of potential  appear  somewhat 
pessimistic,  although  they represent  a clear  improvement  over the former 
official  projections,  which  were  really  made  obsolete  by last  year's  revision 
of benchmarks  in the GNP accounts.  In shifting  to a 1972 base for the 
price  deflator,  the annual  growth  rate of real GNP was reduced  by about 
0.2 percentage  point. This can account  for a large  part  of the apparently 
excessive  growth  of the old series.  Another  important  part  of the difference 
must arise from the redefinition  of the unemployment  rate at potential 
from  the old 4 percent  rate  to the 4.9 percent  for 1976 in the new estimates 
of the  Council  of Economic  Advisers. 
About half of the difference  between  the 1976 estimate  of potential  I 
and  CEA's  revised  one reflects  the difference  in the benchmark  year, 1955. George  L. Perry  43 
If the CEA  series  is adjusted  to the 1955 level  in mine,  their  1976 potential 
becomes  $1,370.7 billion,  or only 0.6 percent  below potential  I and 1.2 
percent  below  potential  II. My estimates  lend  no support  to the pessimistic 
assessment  offered  by CEA that their  own estimates  of potential  may be 
$30 billion  too high  based  on an alternative  reading  of recent  productivity 
developments.21  While  their  estimate  of the 1976 gap is $99 billion and 
mine  is $115 billion  to $124 billion,  their  pessimistic  assessment  implies  a 
gap  of only  $69 billion. 
Future  Potential. An even  more  important  difference  with  CEA comes 
in projecting  growth  rates  of potential.  From 1976 to 1980, CEA projects 
a growth  rate of 31/2 percent a year, while the annual growth  rate of 
potential  I is 3.88 percent  and  that  of potential  II, 4.05 percent.  Even the 
more  conservative  projection  of potential  I for 1980 is some $40 billion 
( 1972 prices) above  CEA's. 
The slowdown  in the growth  of the capital stock and the impact of 
higher  energy  prices  are two reasons  given  by the CEA for its pessimistic 
estimates  of recent  and  prospective  potential  GNP. Since  the effect  of the 
capital  stock on potential  productivity  is so hard  to identify,  it is impos- 
sible  to evaluate  this  concern.  Modest  deviations  from  past  growth  rates  in 
capital-output  ratios may well have only negligible  effects on potential 
productivity.  The capital stock can indeed pose a barrier  to reaching 
potential  if it turns out that industrial  capacity is inadequate  to meet 
future  demands  and thus inflationary  price  pressures  develop  while labor 
markets  are still slack. But that is a different  issue and one that lies well 
beyond  the  scope  of this  paper.22 
I find  it hard  to see how high energy  prices  can affect  productivity  and 
potential  output  much. Energy is one input into production  processes. 
Eventually  some adjustment  of  production  processes to  conserve on 
energy  is likely.  But  the effect  on labor  productivity  can hardly  be measur- 
able.  As Okun  has calculated,  on generous  assumptions  about  how much 
labor  could  be substituted  for energy  in response  to the price  rise  of 1974, 
the  productivity  dent  could  not exceed  $3 billion,  or 0.2 percent.23 
My own projections  of a nearly  4 percent  rate of potential  growth  in 
21. Economic Report of the President,  January  1977, p. 55. 
22. A recent analysis of this problem is made by Barry Bosworth in "Capacity 
Creation  in Basic-Materials  Industries,"  BPEA, 2:1976, pp. 297-341. 
23. Arthur M.  Okun, "Unemployment and Output in  1974," BPEA, 2:1974, 
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the coming  years  rest on the demographic  fact of a maturing  labor  force 
and  what  appear  to me reasonably  conservative  projections  of other  parts 
of the puzzle.  Table 14 summarizes  the ingredients  underlying  the projec- 
tions of the potential  I path and compares  them with past intervals. 
Growth  of both the potential  labor  force and employment  slows to a 2.1 
percent annual  rate in the 1976-81 period, a little slower than in the 
1965-70 interval  and  substantially  slower  than over 1970-76. Growth  in 
business  employment  is sharply  lower than in 1970-76 as the reduction 
in the armed  forces  is not assumed  to continue.  Average  hours  decline  at 
the same  rate  as during  1970-76, an assumption  I find  hard  to justify  but 
also hard  to fault.  The one thing  we know about-demographic shifts- 
could  bring  with  it a slower  decline.  The favorable  development  is in out- 
put  per (unweighted)  hour.  The changing  employment  mix that  was pro- 
jected  in table  8 results  in a much  smaller  difference  between  convention- 
ally measured  and  weighted  productivity  growth  than has been true over 
the  past  decade. 
Given  the estimates  based  on potential  I, reducing  unemployment  to 5 
percent  by reaching  potential  output  for the year 1981 would require  a 
sustained,  strong expansion. Starting  from 1976,  actual employment 
would  have  to rise  by an average  of 3.2 percent  a year  and  real  GNP  would 
have to grow at an average  rate of 5.7 percent a year. Allowing for a 
gradual  deceleration  of the rate of economic  expansion  as potential  is ap- 
proached,  actual  growth  in GNP somewhat  above 6.0 percent  would be 
needed  over  most  of the period.  Should  the path  of potential  II turn  out to 
be the right  description  of the future,  these  same  GNP growth  rates  would 
leave  unemployment  at about  5  1/2percent  in 1981. 
There  is no precedent  in postwar  U.S. economic  performance  for the 
sustained  high  rates  of expansion  projected  here.  The expansion  of 1961- 
66 comes  closest.  However,  it started  with a smaller  GNP gap, and  poten- 
tial  was  growing  less rapidly  than  now  projected.  Furthermore,  that  expan- 
sion began in a period without inflation.  It remains  an open question 
whether,  in coming  years,  inflation  will deter  policymakers  from pursuing 
the rapid  increases  in GNP that would make 1981 a year of 5 percent 
unemployment.  The answer  to that  question  will depend  on many  things: 
how inflation  responds  to the expansion;  how successful  the government 
is with specific anti-inflationary  policies; how much the price level is 
affected  by an energy program  and other economic developments  or 
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Table 14. Profile of Changes in the Economy at Potential, 
Selected Intervals,  1955-81 
Annual rate of growth  in percent 
Projected 
Sector  and  economic  measure 1955-60  1960-65  1965-70  1970-76  1976-81 
Total  economy 
Labor force  1.01  1.29  2.17  2.39  2.08 
Employment  0.97  1.23  2.14  2.31  2.07 
Real GNP  3.49  3.49  3.53  3.91  3.88 
Business  sector 
Employment  1.21  1.11  2.30  2.87  2.07 
Total hours  0.95  0.84  1.41  2.41  1.53 
Output  3.62  3.42  3.64  4.34  3.92 
Output  per hour  2.65  2.56  2.19  1.96  2.35 
Output  per weighted  hour  2.79  2.79  2.67  2.48  2.49 
Source: Author's estimates based on potential I path. 
rate of expansion; and how policymakers balance unemployment targets 
against price stability or other economic goals. Also, if policies to provide 
public jobs directly are pursued vigorously even after unemployment is 
substantially reduced from present levels, then the historical link between 
unemployment and GNP may be stretched, producing a somewhat greater 
decline in unemployment per dollar of GNP than has been estimated here. 
A path for GNP that even approached the one mapped here for achiev- 
ing 5 percent unemployment by 1981 would require a large expansion of 
the capital stock in coming years. And  achieving this expansion would 
mean a rapid rise in business investment. That, in turn, would help spur 
the increase in aggregate demand required and would permit, and even- 
tually require, a reduction in the present full-employment deficit of the 
federal budget. 
APPENDIX 
Alternative  Participation  Equations 
TABLE A-1 presents the estimates of cyclical and trend effects on partici- 
pation rates from several equations. Cyclical effects are expressed by the 46  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
sum of the estimated  coefficients  on the weighted  unemployment  rate. 
Trend  effects  are expressed  by the sum of the time-trend  coefficients  and 
thus  give  the estimated  trend  growth  in participation  rates  for recent  years. 
The equations  are all of the form  of equation  1 in the text. The estimates 
differ  according  to the  period  over  which  the equations  were  estimated  and 
the  year  in which  the  time  trends  start. 
Table A-1. Effects on Labor Force Participation Rates of Equations  with 
Alternative  Estimation  Periods and Time Trends, by Age-Sex Groups 
Effect,  Age group 
period  of estimation, 
and startinig  year of  65 and 
time trend  16-19  20-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  over 
Males 
Cyclical  effect  (sum  of unemployment  coefficients) 
1949-76 
1967  -2.99  -1.79a  -0.12  ...  ...  ...  -2.06k 
1970  -3.78  -1.79a  -0.11  ...  ...  ...  -2.06a 
1954-76 
1967  -2.95  -1.28  -0.07  ...  ...  ...  -2.89 
1970  -4.31  -1.59  ...  ...  -2.20 
1949-73 
1967  -3.39  -2.00a  -0.12  ...  ...  ...  -2.24 
1970  -  3.95  -2.OOa  -0.11  ...  ...  ...  -1.24 
Trend  effect  (sum  of time-trend  coefficients)b 
1949-76 
1967  1.18  ...  -0.19  -0.17  -0.40  -1.37  ... 
1970  2.35  ...  -0.21  -0.23  -0.51  -1.78  ... 
1954-76 
1967  1.30  0.10  -0.18  -0.16  -0.38  -1.30  -2.04 
1970  2.65  0.46  -0.25  -0.17  -0.50  -1.69  -3.11 
1949-73 
1967  0.49  ...  -0.23  -0.12  -0.35  -1.20  -2.13 
1970  1.78  ...  -0.30  -0.21  -0.47  -1.77  -3.87 
Standard errorsb 
1949-76 
1967  2.8  1.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.7  2.5 
1970  2.6  1.4  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.7  2.5 
1954-76 
1967  2.9  0.9  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.7  2.5 
1970  2,6  0.9  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.5  2.6 
1949-73 
1967  2.7  1.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.7  2.5 
1970  2.7  1.4  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.7  2.6 George  L. Perry  47 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Effect,  ge group 
period  of estimation, 
and  starting  year of  65 and 
time trend  16-19  20-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  over 
Females 
Cyclical  effect  (sum  of unemploymenit  coefficients) 
1949-76 
1967  -3.34  -2.42  -2.20  -1.81  -0.99  -0.94 
1970  -4.46  -2.05  -2.72  -1.92  -0.95  -0.83  ... 
1954-76 
1967  -3.32  -2.65  -1.97  -1.67  -0.51  -0.89  ... 
1970  -4.63  -3.32  -2.58  -1.93  -0.43  -0.56  ... 
1949-73 
1967  -3.77  -2.88  -3.28  -2.22  -1.13  -1.18  ... 
1970  -4.69  -2.20  -3.20  -2.24  -1.10  -1.13  ... 
Trend  effect  (sum  of time-trenid  coefficients)b 
1949-76 
1967  3.09  2.89  4.12  2.33  0.49  -0.44  -2.36 
1970  4.57  3.26  5.25  2.63  0.16  -0.94  -3.49 
1954-76 
1967  3.13  2.87  4.13  2.43  0.45  -0.27  -2.27 
1970  4.55  3.69  5.10  2.88  0.05  -1.14  -2.97 
1949-73 
1967  2.76  2.70  3.61  1.83  0.30  -0.60  -2.26 
1970  4.61  3.10  4.75  1.89  0.38  -1.55  -3.53 
Stanzdard  errorsb 
1949-76 
1967  2.6  1.7  2.0  1.4  1.8  1.9  4.3 
1970  2.7  2.0  2.1  1.4  1.8  2.0  4.4 
1954-76 
1967  2.8  1.5  1.7  1.2  1.4  1.6  3.3 
1970  2.9  1.6  1.8  1.3  1.3  1.5  3.0 
1949-73 
1967  2.7  1.7  1.7  1.2  1.9  2.0  4.6 
1970  2.9  2.1  2.1  1.3  1.9  2.0  4.6 
Source: Estimated by author. 
a.  Neither time trend appeared in this equation. 
b. The results were multiplied by 100. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Michael  L. Wachter:  George Perry  has updated  his 1971 paper on po- 
tential output, concluding  that the traditional  macroeconomic  supply 
model is still reliable and that the economy has the potential  for full- 
speed-ahead  economic growth  between 1977 and 1981. Methodologi- 
cally, Perry  presents  a viable, coherent,  and consistent  model of what I 
view to be the "optimistic"-perhaps  highly  optimistic-story of current 
and  near-term  supply  developments.  My approach  to the supply  side  inter- 
prets  the data in a different  framework  and arrives  at significantly  lower 
estimates  of potential  output.  In this comment  I utilize  my framework  for 
a critique  of Perry's  methodology  and to indicate  the various areas in 
which  he may  be overstating  potential  output. 
Most of my comments  will be directed  at the labor supply  equations, 
which are, as Perry notes, a pivotal component  of his potential  output 
series. I have long been surprised  that Perry,  having devised the initial 
adjustment  of the unemployment  rate for changes  in the labor  force mix, 
would remain  a proponent  of the large GNP gap. The old measure  of 
the gap was built on the foundation  of a 4 percent equilibrium  unem- 
ployment  rate, and the Perry  index clearly  exhibits  a nonaccelerating  in- 
flation  rate of unemployment  considerably  higher  than 4 percent.  If the 
benchmark,  noninflationary  rate  is high,  where  are  the extra  unutilized  re- 
sources  necessary  to generate  a large  GNP gap?  Part  of the answer  to this 
problem  is that Perry has hidden away a large group of "discouraged 
workers."  These workers  will flood into the labor market,  at unchanged 
real and  nominal  wage rates,  to provide  the upward  ratchet  for potential 
output.  Indeed,  for some age-sex  groups,  the coefficients  of table 1 pre- 
dicting new additions  to the labor force per net job created  suggest a 
deluge  of new  entrants  or reentrants. 
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My own results  suggest  a different  interpretation  of the participation 
rates; and, Perry's  new calculations  notwithstanding,  I believe that the 
evidence  for a sizable  discouraged-worker  component  is shaky. Perry's 
significant  and  quantitatively  important  unemployment  coefficient  in table 
1 is highly  dependent  on his specification  of the participation  model. In 
particular,  Perry's  ability  to discount  the inflation  variable  as explaining 
participation  rather  than unemployment  is affected  by his use of a split- 
trend  variable  broken  in 1967 or 1970. My earlier  results  suggested  that 
the discouraged-worker  model began to generate  perverse  predictions  in 
1969-70, a period  in which unemployment  increased  and participation 
rates rose significantly.  The split trend  in 1967 or 1970 allows Perry  to 
relabel  this  seemingly  perverse  rise  in participation  rates  as part  of the new 
sociological  attitudes  of younger  women toward  market  work. Since in- 
flation  rates also accelerated  after 1970, these two variables  are highly 
collinear.  In straight  horse races between unemployment  and inflation 
rates,  without  the broken  trend,  the latter  does considerably  better  than 
it does  in the  results  reported  in table  4. 
Using the inflation  variable  in place of the discouraged-worker  effect 
suggests  several  changes  in the interpretation  of the potential-output  mea- 
sure. First, unless the inflation  rate continues  to trend  upward,  most of 
the cyclically  sensitive  or "inflation-sensitive"  workers  are already  in the 
labor  force. Although  the labor force will continue  to grow rapidly  over 
the next few years  because of underlying  population  growth  in the rele- 
vant  age groups,  there  should  not be a new "bonus"  of newly  encouraged 
workers  as  unemployment  falls  to its noninflationary  level. 
Second,  the implications  of the presence  of inflation-sensitive  workers 
are different  from those of discouraged  workers.  The latter are a pure 
bonus  in that  they  enter  the labor  force  regardless  of wage  and  price  move- 
ments.  The former  are a part  of the supply  picture  only at a cost in infla- 
tion. An exogenous  potential  output,  measured  at zero inflation-in  the 
Perry  tradition-would exclude  these  workers. 
Third,  although  the empirical  results  are ambiguous,  many cyclically 
sensitive  or inflation-sensitive  workers  are likely to be only temporary 
additions  to the labor force at full employment  with 6 percent  inflation. 
As Mincer  originally  warned  us, the discouraged-worker  effect may be 
measuring  the "timing"  of part-time  workers.  If some workers  want to 
work  part  of the time, they have an obvious  incentive  to coordinate  their 
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unemployment  rates  (and  high  discounted  real  wages). Empirically,  there 
is considerable  evidence  of a large  contingent  of workers  who work  part 
of the time  and  frequently  move  into and  out of the labor  force.  The better 
or more  rational  the timing  of these workers,  the greater  the appearance 
of a large "discouraged  worker"  contingent.  If the economy  manages  to 
stay at full employment,  these workers  will eventually  drift out of the 
labor force, reducing  potential output. This timing effect may also be 
relevant  to inflation-sensitive  workers  to the extent  that they are  respond- 
ing to short-term  money  illusion.  I do not believe that these workers  are 
all temporary  additions,  but it is highly  optimistic  to believe, at the other 
extreme,  that  they are all permanent  additions. 
In short,  I would favor excluding  the discouraged-worker  contingent 
from an exogenous  measure  of potential  output.  It is unclear  that these 
workers  are cyclically  rather  than  inflation  sensitive  and  that  they will re- 
main  in the labor  force if the economy  is at full employment  for any ex- 
tended  period  of time. Removing  this group  would considerably  reduce 
Perry's  potential  output  measure  for 1976. 
An additional  issue in the equations  for labor  force participation  con- 
cerns  the role of relative  wages.  Here a data  problem  is the main culprit 
in Perry's  insignificant  and  incorrect  coefficients.  Although  Perry  uses the 
aggregate  wage as the basis for the w/w* construct,  the desired  variable 
is an unavailable  age-specific  wage rate. Apparently,  it is largely after 
1970 that age-specific  and aggregate  wages diverge  in any meaningful 
way. In particular,  aggregate  real wages increase  dramatically  in 1971 
and 1972, but not those for young workers.  The sharp increase  in the 
relative  percentage  of young workers  reduced  their relative  wage as it 
increased  their  relative  unemployment  rates.  My argument  has been that 
the increase  in participation  rates  for young  females  and  the concomitant 
decrease  in fertility  rates  is related  to their (relatively)  adverse  labor  mar- 
ket  experiences.  This  has  been  confirmed  by  the data  of the 1970s although 
it does  not appear  in the aggregate  data  on wage  rates. 
Fluctuations  in the labor  force due to changes  in relative  wages  among 
cohorts  are  intermediate-run  swings  that  are  similar  in some  respects  to the 
Kuznets  cycle. Hence they are not quantitatively  important  for Perry's 
short-run  prognosis.  They do have significant  implications,  however,  for 
extrapolating  the growth  of the labor  force into the 1980s. In particular, 
these models  suggest  that labor  force growth  would be considerably  less 
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Perry's  trend  variable  mechanically  extrapolates  into the future  some- 
thing like the very rapid recent increases  in participation  rates among 
young  females.  In the context  of an overall  demographic  model, this im- 
plies a further  significant  drop  in fertility  and  school-enrollment  rates  for 
young  people.  I believe  that  this  outcome  is unlikely.  As the current  baby- 
boom cohort  ages,  the high level of participation  rates  for young  women 
today  is likely  to be reflected  in higher  participation  rates  for older  women 
in the future.  It is much  more  problematical,  however,  to predict  that  the 
next cohort  of young  women  will have an even higher  participation  rate 
than  the current  cohort. 
Again,  these  considerations  suggest  that  Perry's  labor  force  projections 
are too high.  In addition,  they suggest  that  potential  output  should  not be 
treated  as an exogenous  variable.  In the short and long runs,  the supply 
constraint  of society  is responsive  to fluctuations  in economic  variables. 
Besides  overstating  labor  force growth,  Perry  may, I believe,  overstate 
the noninflationary  rates  of employment  for the different  age-sex  groups. 
My comments  here  have  been based  on the model  I outlined  in a previous 
paper (BPEA, 1:1976), and they suggest  an increase  in the steady-state 
unemployment  rate of approximately  one-half  percent  (on aggregate  un- 
employment)  beyond  that suggested  by Perry.  In addition,  if that model 
is correct,  Perry's  wage-weighting  scheme  is also too optimistic.  The larg- 
est cohorts  will suffer  an adverse  relative-wage  adjustment.  Hence, Perry 
is always  giving  the largest  groups  too high a relative  wage rate. This is 
especially  a problem  for near-term  projections  as the  boom-babies  age and 
enter  the  prime-age  categories. 
In his discussion  of productivity  Perry  seems  appropriately  cautious  on 
the question  of the long-term  productivity  trend.  This remains  an area  of 
substantial  uncertainty.  His productivity  estimates,  however,  specifically 
ignore  the potential  problems  that he identifies.  Of particular  concern  to 
me is the continuing  shift between  unemployment  rates  and capacity  uti- 
lization  rates  as measured  by either  the Wharton  or the Federal  Reserve 
Board  index.  In all cases, the shift indicates  that the noninflationary  un- 
employment  rate  may be above  5.5 percent  (at least in the short  run) or 
that  the capital-stock  numbers  are overstated,  or both. The quality  of the 
data  on capacity  and capital  stock is open to some question;  however,  it 
seems  unlikely  that  errors  in these  variables  would  make  this  problem  dis- 
appear  entirely.  In other words, Perry's  estimates  represent  the upper 
bound  of the supply  constraints  on the capital  stock. 52  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
In general,  Perry  is consistent  in developing  an upper  bound for po- 
tential  output.  His calculations  may well turn out to be correct,  but a 
growth  policy  based  on his supply  series  has major  inflationary  risks. 
Otto  Eckstein:  George  Perry's  paper  carefully  updates  his earlier  study  of 
the full-employment  labor  force and  potential  GNP, and explores  econo- 
metrically  the changing  participation  rates for the major groups  in the 
population.  He confirms  that the participation  rate of women  has accel- 
erated  and is rooted in sociological  fundamentals.  He also finds a break 
in the time  trends  for adult  men,  whose  participation  rate  is falling.  While 
he offers  little  explanation  of this  phenomenon,  one can  easily  turn  to such 
factors as changes  in the social security,  unemployment  insurance,  and 
welfare  systems,  early  retirement  provisions  in collective  bargaining  agree- 
ments,  perhaps  the regional  distribution  of older  workers  as compared  to 
changing  job opportunities,  perhaps the increasing  competition  from 
women  for certain  categories  of jobs, perhaps  even a decline  in the work 
ethic.  As medical  knowledge  of heart  disease  and other  degenerative  dis- 
eases improves,  we may live to regret  the policy decisions  that  have low- 
ered  the retirement  age and  that  have hurt  the participation  rates  of male 
workers  increasingly  from  age  25 on. 
But there are two other important  questions  raised  more directly  by 
the Perry  paper:  First, should  we accept  the Perry  estimate  of a potential 
growth  rate  near  4 percent  for the next five  years,  contrary  to the conclu- 
sions of various  other studies  including  those by Roger Brinner  for DRI 
and by the Council of Economic Advisers in their last annual  report? 
Second,  for the kind of economy  in which  we now live, what  really  is the 
pertinence  of the concept of potential output?  I shall deal with these 
briefly  in turn. 
Perry concludes that the probable  annual growth rate for potential 
GNP for the period 1976-81 is 3.9 percent.  This is roughly  half a point 
higher  than  the CEA or DRI conclusions.  When  Brookings  disagrees  with 
the  CEA and  DRI, we had  better  take  a look at  the  reasons. 
The table  below juxtaposes  the components  of the growth  of potential 
GNP for the Perry (Brookings) and  Brinner  (DRI) studies.  It shows  the 
source  of difference  between  the two projections.  There  is no substantive 
disagreement  in the analysis  of the growth  in the full-employment  labor 
force or in potential  output  for the historical  period, although  there are 
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breaks  in the age composition  and  uses unweighted  unemployment  rates. 
His formulas  for the cyclical element in participation  rates are of the 
standard  type, as are Perry's.  Differences  in definition  and slightly  differ- 
ent periods  lead to differences  in the growth  rates of 0.1 point. For the 
periods  of the individual  studies  shown  in the table, the potential  growth 
rates  for the labor  force are very close, although  over the specific  1976- 
81 interval  that Perry reports on, the Brinner  projection  would show 
slightly  lower growth.  However,  the forecast  horizon  reveals  the impact 
of the different  methodologies  plus alternative  assessments  of the outlook 
for productivity  growth. 
Perry  study  Brinner  study 
Component  of growth  1960-76  1976-81  1963-73  1973-80 
Compoutnd  annual  rates  of growth 
Labor  force  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.1 
RealGNP  3.7  3.9  3.8  3.4 
Implicit  GNP per person  1 .6  1 .8 
Total inputs  ...  ...  2.8  2.3 
Total factor  productivity  ...  ...  1 .0  1 .0 
Perry  bases his analysis  on the labor-productivity  trend,  while  Brinner 
uses the aggregate-production-function  approach.  There  may  have  been a 
time when the two approaches  came to about  the same conclusion,  and 
both are of long standing.  The projections  in a 1960 study  for the Joint 
Economic  Committee,  by James W. Knowles, The Potential  Economic 
Growth in the United States, used a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
This was one of the first analyses of the problem, and its projections 
proved  to be correct  for the 1960s. While  the two approaches  may have 
given similar  answers  in the past, they cannot  be expected  to do so now. 
Growth  of the capital stock has slowed severely-from  3.9 to 2.9 per- 
cent-because of the liquidity  crisis  in 1973-74 and the subsequent  deep 
recession.  With  the Cobb-Douglas  factor-share  weights,  this decline  cuts 
the growth  of potential  output  by a third  of a point. 
Could  such a dramatic  reduction  in the growth  of capital  have no im- 
pact on the growth  of potential?  Only a strange  economic  theory  would 
reach  that conclusion.  Perhaps  technology  is really so disembodied  that 
the  Cobb-Douglas  function  inadequately  represents  the role  of capital.  But 
that  there  be no relation  between  capital  and  output  is impossible!  And yet 
that is what an analysis  of potential  output  based on nothing  but labor 
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Furthermore,  the  labor-productivity  approach  breaks  down  statistically 
for recent  years,  as Perry  shows.  He finds  a break  in the time trends  and 
employs  a lower time trend  beginning  with 1969. That trend creates a 
slowdown  of 0.3 to 0.4 percent  from  that date onward.  Further,  it is nec- 
essary  to dummy  out 1974, which admittedly  was a very strange  year  for 
productivity  because  business  was operating  on a false set of expectations. 
But  with 1974 dropped,  it is difficult  to use 1975, the year  after  the liquid- 
ity crisis  forced  business  to cut employment  by 2.4 million  people  between 
September  1974 and  April 1975. 
The aggregate-production-function  approach  runs into some of the 
same  problems  since  labor  is still the principal  factor  of production.  But it 
is possible to fit equations  that treat 1974 as just another  year with an 
error,  and that identify  a trend  in total-factor  productivity  that is reason- 
ably constant.  To the extent  that there  is any doubt about  it, the factor- 
productivity  trend  gives some statistical  hints of a small slowdown  in the 
early 1970s. The Brinner  formulation  assumes  the factor productivity 
trend  to be constant.  If that  trend  were assumed  to have slowed  down  by 
0.1 or 0.2 percent (or more), which some equation  forms and intervals 
yield,  the projected  growth  of potential  would  be even  lower  than  the esti- 
mates  of 3.4 percent  that  he advances. 
The concept of potential GNP is the purest Keynesian  macroeco- 
nomics  that can still be found. Originally,  potential  GNP was seen as the 
gauge for identifying  the gap of underutilized  resources,  and was prin- 
cipally the baseline for calculating  the "inflationary  gap" advanced  by 
Keynes  in How to Pay for the War and  still shown  in basic  textbooks  as a 
method  of inflation  analysis.  For that  purpose,  potential  GNP must  nowa- 
days be considered  thoroughly  inadequate  because  it has nothing  to say 
about the cost side or the dynamics  of inflation.  Even as a measure  of 
demand,  it focuses  solely  on the aggregate  unemployment  rate,  completely 
leaving  aside  the more  pressing  problems  of capacity  bottlenecks,  resource 
shortages,  or even skill shortages  within  the labor market.  To argue  for 
any particular  economic  policy because  there is a full-employment  gap, 
as indicated  by potential  GNP, nowadays  really  is an error.  To assess  the 
inflation  implications  of any particular  policy, one must use far more 
sophisticated  techniques-in my  view,  a complete,  detailed  model  in which 
the gap  is just  another  variable. 
While too crude a measure  for inflation  analysis,  potential  GNP re- 
mains an essential  ingredient  in the most precise method  for projecting 
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that Okun's  law is the best predictor  of aggregate  unemployment,  and 
that aggregate  unemployment  is the dominant  explanatory  variable  for 
most sectoral  unemployment  rates. Thus potential  GNP, along with lots 
of other  information,  is needed to formulate  macro  policies designed  to 
reach specific  unemployment  goals. 
Further,  the growth  of potential  GNP is a determinant  of the overall 
scale of the economy.  In long-term  analysis  of such demands  as those for 
housing  or automobiles,  the aggregate  growth  of real purchasing  power, 
along with demographic  and other variables,  determines  the long-term 
trend  values.  Depending  upon income elasticities,  these trend  values  will 
vary  systematically  with  the trend  of potential  GNP. 
For these reasons,  a careful  formulation  of potential  GNP remains  of 
importance  even after  the numerous  limitations  of this still very aggrega- 
tive concept  are recognized.  It is my belief that  we will obtain  better  eco- 
nomic performance  if we resolve  our doubts  about  potential  GNP on the 
side of caution. 
Peter  K. Clark:  There  are  some  similarities  and  many  differences  between 
Perry's  methodology  for obtaining  an estimate  of potential  GNP and the 
technique  used  in obtaining  the revised  series  on potential  GNP published 
in the 1977 Economic Report of the President. The most striking similar- 
ity is the estimate  of 4.9 percent  as the overall  unemployment  rate  in 1976 
equivalent  to 4.0 percent  in 1955. This similarity  is less surprising  when 
one realizes  that  neither  Perry's  technique  nor  the technique  implicit  in the 
council  estimate  uses a structural  model of unemployment;  instead,  both 
estimates  are an empirical  description  of the rising  proportion  of young 
persons  in the labor  force, and  rising  unemployment  rates  for these  young 
people  relative  to the unemployment  rate  for adults. 
One of the differences  in Perry's  results  is the strong  cyclical  sensitivity 
he finds  in the labor force. For example,  in 1976, Perry  estimates,  if the 
unemployment  rate had been 2.8 points lower, the labor force would 
have been 2.8 million larger.  In general,  if employment  increases  by ten 
persons,  between  four and five additional  workers  enter  the labor force. 
The reason for this large increase  is the strong cyclical dependence  of 
labor  force  participation  rates  for adult  women (aged 25-64).  The coun- 
cil's revised  estimates  of potential  GNP assume  an increase  in the labor 
force of about 0.4 percent  for every  percent  decrease  in the unemploy- 
ment  rate.  That  implies  an increase  of only 1.1 million  in the labor  force 
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Other differences  between Perry's  methodology  and the council's  in- 
clude the latter's  use of quarterly  data,  which  should  be more  accurate  in 
capturing  the effects  of cyclical  variability  than Perry's  annual  data, and 
its use of the capital  stock and total-factor  productivity  rather  than  labor 
productivity.  Instead  of belaboring  these differences,  however,  it may be 
more  instructive  to look at some alternative  methodologies  that  were  used 
neither  by Perry  nor  by the council  for a resolution  of the conflict  between 
the two potential  GNP series. 
As a rough  check  on the level of potential  GNP in 1976, one may cal- 
culate the percentage  change  in real GNP (Q)  associated  with a given 
percentage-point  change  in the unemployment  rate  by estimating  an equa- 
tion of the form 
(1)  Ut  -Ut-  a +  b (Q)  + et, 
where 
u = the overall  unemployment  rate  in percent 
AQ/Q =  percent  change  in gross national  product  in 1972 dollars. 
This is, of course,  the first  of the three  equations  used by Okun  in his 
original  estimate  of potential  GNP. Using annual  data for 1953-76, the 
following  regression  results  were  obtained: 
Aut  =  1.45 -  0.40  Q 
(0.18)  (0.04)  Q/t 
-R  =  0.78;  Durbin-Watson  == 2.37. 
The figures  in parentheses  are standard  errors.  This equation  says that a 
1 percent  increase  in real GNP reduces  unemployment  0.4 percentage 
point below what it would have been otherwise.  The constant  term 1.45 
is an estimate  of how much  the unemployment  rate  will rise during  a year 
in which no real growth  occurs.  The implied  "Okun's  law" multiplier  is 
2.5, much  less than  the 3.1 reported  by Perry.  Regressions  excluding  the 
years 1974-76 produce  Okun's  law multipliers  that are even smaller. 
If a lagged value of percentage  change  in real GNP is entered  in the 
equation  in order  to obtain  a "longer-run"  reaction  of unemployment  to 
output,  the results  are  a lower  multiplier: 
Aut =  1.73 -  0.40 (Q)  -  0.08 (  Q 
(0.04)  Q  t  (0.04)  Q  t-l 
R2 = 0.80;  Durbin-Watson  2.40;  annual data, 1953-1976. 
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The same equation  using  quarterly  data  provides  a similar  picture: 
ALtt  =  0.38 -  0.24  ,_Q_  -  0.18 (Q 
(0.04)  (0.02)  Q  t  (0.02)  Q  t-/ 
PI = 0.77;  Durbin-Watson  =1.89;  p  = 0.23;  quarterly  data, 1953:2-1976:4. 
Aut = 0.45 -  0.25  0.10 (  )  Q  -  0.08 (  Q) 
(0.04)  (0.02)  Qt  (0.01)  \Q  t  (0.0l)  Q  t-2 
- 0.05  Q  - 0.03  tQ 
(0.005)\  Q/ t-  (0.003)  Q  t-4 
R1  0.75;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.89;  p-0.27;  quarterly  data, 1953:2-1976:4. 
The last four regression  coefficients  are constrained  to lie on a straight 
line. The implied  Okun's  law multipliers  are 2.4 and 2.0, respectively.  Of 
course, a considerably  higher multiplier  could have been obtained by 
using quarterly  data and no lagged values for output changes,  but this 
procedure  has serious specification  bias due to the lagged response of 
labor  input  to output. 
From these regressions,  which are not influenced  by a prior estimate 
of potential  GNP, I conclude  that a decrease  of one percentage  point in 
the unemployment  rate  would  increase  real GNP 2.0 to 2.5 percent.  Ap- 
plied to an "unemployment  gap"  of 2.8 percentage  points in 1976, this 
multiplier  yields a potential GNP of $1,335 billion to $1,353 billion 
(1972 prices), somewhat  less than  the council  estimate  of $1,364 billion 
and  much  less than  the lower  of the two Perry  estimates  of $1,379 billion. 
If the Okun's  law multiplier  is 2.5 or less, how did Perry get 3.1? The 
answer  is clear:  Perry's  estimate  of the reaction  of unemployment  to out- 
put  is biased  downward  by his high  estimate  of potential  output.  The equa- 
tion  in Perry's  table 13 is: 
u-u  =  a,(Q  Q) +  a2D74. 
The higher  the level of potential  (Q), the lower  the regression  coefficient 
a,, and  the higher  1  /a,, the Okun's  law multiplier.  Although  estimation  of 
the multiplier  using this form of Okun's  law usually  results  in a slightly 
larger  number,  the increase  is not large  enough  to change  the 2.5 result 
when  lagged  values  of output  are  included  in the equation. 
Aside from  the rough  Okun's  law estimates  of 1976 potential  ($1,335- 
$1,353 billion  in 1972 prices) just discussed,  there  is other  evidence  that 
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ing equation  estimates  the trend  and  cycle  in private  nonfarm  productivity 
from 1953 to 1976: 
LP =  -0.55  -  0.0146URMA +  0.OO8OURMA  (-1)  +  0.00684TIME 
(0.01)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.0002) 
-  0.00213T1 -  0.028D1  -  0.024D2  -  0.019D3, 
(0.0003)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
TV =  0.998;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.53;  p  =  0.59;  quarterly  data, 1953:2 to 1976:4. 
where 
LP = logarithmic  index  of labor  productivity  in the  private  nonfarm 
sector,  'all persons 
URMA  = unemployment  rate of men 25-54, adjusted  for the sampling 
change  in 1967 
TIME  -time  trend, 1, 2, 3, 4,  ... 
Tl  =  0 through 1966:4, then 1, 2, 3, 4  ... 
DI =  1974  dummy,  equals 1.0 in 1974,  zero otherwise 
D2 =  1975  dummy 
D3  1976  dummy. 
The magnitude  of the D2 and  D3 coefficients  supports  the possibility  that 
a 2 percent  drop  in the level of productivity  has been maintained  through 
1976. Alternative  estimates  using capital  inputs  and total factor  produc- 
tivity strengthen  this conclusion,  since capital  utilization  has rebounded 
faster  in 1975 and 1976 than  has labor  utilization.  Although  an extraor- 
dinary  cyclical fall in productivity  in 1974 is easy to understand,  the 
persistence  of this gap throughout  the recovery  years of 1975 and 1976 
casts  considerable  doubt  on the  hypothesis  that  the  post-1973  productivity 
shortfall  is only temporary. 
These two empirical  checks  tend to confirm  the council's  revised  esti- 
mate for potential GNP for 1976 and to reject the figure  proposed  by 
Perry.  As for the future,  since  both Perry's  projections  and  ones based  on 
the council's  revised  figures  are trend  extrapolations,  neither  provides  a 
very reliable  base for a forecast.  However,  the bad productivity  perfor- 
mance  since 1966 and the steep  productivity  decline  in 1973-74 caution 
one about future productivity  gains. The council's current (unofficial) 
projection  of output  at 4.8 percent  unemployment  in 1981 of $1,623 bil- 
lion (1972 prices), which  assumes  that  the post-1973 productivity  short- 
fall will be eliminated,  represents  a modestly  optimistic  view of growth  in 
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George  L. Perry:  I disagree  fundamentally  with Wachter  on the role of 
wage variables  as opposed  to unemployment  in the estimation  of the be- 
havior of participation  rates. One can think of unemployment  equa- 
tions as reduced  forms  of relations  that  include  the real  wage  that  matters 
to workers:  cyclically,  this relevant  real wage changes  with explicit  wage 
differences  like those discussed  by Okun  and  Vroman  in connection  with 
cyclical  upgrading,  and with indirect  differences  that show up in conve- 
nience and other nonwage aspects of the job. None of this gets mea- 
sured  by available  wage series,  but it is related  to unemployment.  I also 
disagree  basically with Wachter's  preference  for inflation  variables  in 
place of trends.  I can imagine  room for both and I used both. The trend 
variable  was used to capture  something  quite different  from inflation,  a 
complex  sociological  phenomenon  that economists  ought  to take as given 
and not pretend  to explain  in terms  of a few simple  macroeconomic  vari- 
ables.  The women's  movement  is not simply  a response  to unanticipated 
inflation. 
Nor do I believe models that assert that the participation  induced 
by low unemployment  is temporary.  The  biggest  cyclical  response  is found 
for teenagers.  Are they just reallocating  toward  the present  their  lifetime 
quota  of work,  planning  to reduce  it correspondingly  at some later date? 
This view is not persuasive  for any labor force group.  Indeed, quite the 
opposite seems to be the case. Work is habit forming  and being drawn 
into the work force in the present apparently  raises the probability  of 
being  in it in the future.  Thus I see no reason  not to treat  estimated  par- 
ticipation  effects as permanent  and as a component  of potential  output 
measures. 
General  Discussion 
Some participants  discussed the possible inflationary  consequences 
of operating  at the unemployment  rate underlying  Perry's  potential  out- 
put.  Robert  J. Gordon  reasoned  that  the 1955 benchmark  period  was one 
of accelerating  inflation;  and  he noted  that  for more  recent  years,  both he 
and  Michael  Wachter  had  obtained  higher  estimates  of the unemployment 
rate associated  with nonaccelerating  inflation.  Charles  Holt questioned 
the use of a constant  weighted  unemployment  rate as a standard  for de- 
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as a weighting  measure  for different  groups  of unemployed  and  the use of 
3.32 percent as a reference  level for weighted  unemployment  as quite 
arbitrary.  He felt that, ideally, an explicit theory  of wage and price dy- 
namics  should  be incorporated  in deriving  the weights  appropriate  to each 
group;  and  this theory,  in turn,  would  provide  a measure  of the noninfla- 
tionary  unemployment  level to link with the potential-output  analysis. 
Lawrence  Klein felt that the omission of  an explicit treatment  of 
energy and resource  limitations  cast doubt upon the estimates  of the 
long-run  trend.  Simulations  with large-scale  macroeconomic  and input- 
output  models  indicate  that  high  prices  for oil and  other  raw  materials  and 
high energy  requirements  lead to large trade deficits and high inflation 
rates  along  GNP  paths  comparable  to Perry's  potential.  Although  cyclical 
recovery  might allow temporary  growth  at rates greater  than potential, 
the long-run  path would have to be adjusted  downward  unless specific 
policies  were  adopted  to remove  bottlenecks.  Franco  Modigliani  disagreed 
that trade  deficits  would be a hindrance  in attaining  potential.  Either  the 
OPEC  countries  would  buy goods from  the United  States  with  the money 
they earned  from  oil or they would sell us the oil on credit. 
Modigliani  criticized  Otto Eckstein's  argument  that the productivity 
trend  must  have declined  because  of a lower rate of capital  formation  as 
simply  a blank assertion.  Not only was the relation  between  capital  and 
labor productivity  uncertain,  but the future growth of capital was not 
yet known.  Robert  Hall conjectured  that capital  might  not be closely re- 
lated  to movements  in labor  productivity,  supporting  Perry's  decision  not 
to incorporate  capital as an explicit determinant  of potential output. 
Production-function  estimates  always  make  use of additional  evidence  on 
capital  income,  and although  it is common  practice  to attribute  all profits 
to physical  capital,  intangible  capital  might  actually  be a substantial  part 
of the story. However,  Eckstein  cautioned  that a bias understating  the 
importance  of capital  stemmed  from  considering  all technological  progress 
as disembodied. 